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ABSTRACT 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a U.S. government agency whose 
purpose is to promote economic growth and reduce poverty in low and low middle-income 
countries. It uses indicators to endorse countries eligibilities for international development 
funding. These indicators are related to economic growth and are developed by independent 
third parties (e.g., United Nations, World Bank), to evaluate a country’s policy performance 
in three specific areas: (1) Ruling Justly, (2) Investing in People, and (3) Encouraging 
Economic Freedom (MCC, 2011). The MCC weighs indicators equally regardless of their 
myopic in-country relevancy to economic development. The goal of this study is to first 
replicate the MCC funding mechanism then examine the effect of weighting each of the 
MCC's indicators differently and analyzing the subsequent effects on a countries’ funding 
eligibilities. This study found that many countries were marginally below the median 
because of one outlier which skewed the mean score. The results signify both the 
transparency of the calculations and the MCC's funding decisions. Given that by definition 
low-income countries need economic assistance, and such assistance is often times 
distributed through indicators like those used by the MCC; this thesis suggests making the 
index holistic to capture the relative strengths and weaknesses of each country.   
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I.         INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview 
Given their wide range of applications economic indices are used for many purposes. 
Some published indicators are used to understand an event (economic growth, economic 
development, social behavior, poverty, etc.), while others are useful for comparing countries 
within economic or social context (Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Income, Human 
Development Index, Global Hunger Index, etc.). According to Renaud (2009), indicators play 
three primary roles: (1) to inform citizens and public opinion in general, (2) to alert the actors 
of a given system by providing indications by which actors should take actions, and (3) to 
enable guidance and actions by helping actors to understand and deepen their thinking, and to 
act. In addition, indicators are considered to be incentives to decision makers and designers of 
decision making processes because processes that rely on indicators can be presented as 
efficient, consistent, transparent, scientific, and impartial (Davis, Kingsbury and Merry, 
2010). 
However, developing and subsequently estimating social and economic indicators is a 
challenging task. It has to be related to the event that people or institutions want to properly 
understand and respond to. This typically involves many variables (endogenous and 
exogenous) that have to be considered whenever a given indicator is to be estimated. Each 
individual, country, or system has his/its internal characteristics that people or institutions 
have to integrate when weighing or scoring indicators; otherwise they will lead to inconsistent 
or misleading results. Many times, people or institutions choose some variables that are easily 
analyzed and lead to predictable results, and ignore (either consciously or sub consciously) the 
most important variables because of their complexity or lack of data. Therefore, it is important 
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to understand the context or the situation in order to design a reliable indicator regardless of 
its complexity. This thesis focuses on the seventeen indicators used by the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) to endorse countries eligibilities for development funding.  
 B. Approach and Objective 
The MCC, a U.S. government corporation, established in January 2004, provides 
grants to developing countries (low and low-middle income) in order to expedite their 
economic growth. Grants provided by the MCC fall into two categories; a compact program 
(a multi-year agreement between the MCC and an eligible country to fund specific programs 
targeted at reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth) or threshold program (small 
and shorter-term grants to help countries improve their performance on eligibility policy 
indicator). Since 2004, sixteen countries have benefited from the MCC’s grants, which are 
considered to be a significant economic catalyst for development in these selected countries. 
Yet, the MCC’s approach has been subject to criticism and the results in terms of 
development priorities and results are ambiguous. There were instances of economic progress 
and success, the first phase of the MCC was marked by controversies, criticism and missteps 
(Hewko, 2010). Hewko (2010) stated that the MCC was not equipped to monitor the sixteen 
initial eligible countries, which forced the MCC’s senior management to be more 
bureaucratic rather than working to assist the world’s poor. Furthermore, a country’s data 
may hide the differences between urban and rural populations (“Urban Bias”), ethnic groups 
(social classes’ differences), genders (discrimination against women because of religious 
reasons), etc. The MCC uses indicators (see Figures 2.1 to 2.3) to evaluate a country’s policy 
performance throughout three broad policy dimensions: (1) Ruling Justly, (2) Investing in 
People, and (3) Encouraging Economic Freedom (MCC, 2011a). The MCC has chosen to 
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weigh indicators differently, and gives a high weight to corruption which is a subjective 
indicator. To be eligible for MCC funding, a country must be above the median for the 
Control of Corruption indicator when compared to its peers (same income group). There is 
no steadfast scientific method to analyze corruption; it is solely based on experts’ subjective 
opinions. The on the ground experts may use different sources to analyze corruption or may 
be sensitive to common endogenous or exogenous factors while giving their opinions 
(Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006). The World Bank’s indicators which the MCC uses can 
over represent expert opinions because of their greater availability on the market, which can 
introduce a sample bias in their favor, which is difficult to control (Razafindrakoto and 
Roubaud, 2006). Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, (2006) question how these experts weigh 
these differences between bureaucratic corruption and political corruption, or between central 
government and local government corruption. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud also stated that 
the poorer the country and those with sparser information, the more fragile the corruption 
indicator will probably be, and thus the less accurate. Therefore, those who are maybe the 
most needy (the poorest of the poor who likely have the weakest data) have a reduced 
probability of getting funding. In addition, when considering certain indicators such as 
health, education and the environment, how can a poor country afford to invest in these 
sectors in order to be above the median and be competitive for funding? The funding 
mechanism itself is build somewhat like the poverty trap, those who are poor (with either 
poor indicator score or no data at all) simply fall further behind those countries above the 
mean who receive MCC funding and continue to develop. For instance, suppose there are 
two low income countries, A and B. Country A gets funding because it is above the median 
whereas B does not get funding since its performance is below the median. Several years 
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later, country A makes progress while country B does not; in fact country B’s situation gets 
worse. For the future MCC funding, country A will have a higher probability of receiving 
funding compared to country B which will be further below the median, thus reduce its 
probability for the MCC funding. Examples like this are why Hewko (2010) considered that 
indicators might exhibit a perpetual income bias. In order to select an indicator, the MCC 
should consider the role it may play in providing an incentive for countries to perform better 
in that area to receive the future MCC funding (Bellefleur and Plagman, 2010). That is, 
instead of disqualifying a country for being below the average, a better question could be “if 
we invested in this country, would it enhance a sector that would bring the country above the 
average?” If a funding agency is rewarding development ex post instead of encouraging 
development on the ground level, are priorities not skewed?   
  This study intends to explore a relative approach to economic indices based on what 
has been done, and what could be fairly applicable to all low income countries for 
development agencies to reach funding decisions. To reach this goal, this thesis will analyze 
two issues: 1) deconstruct and then replicate the existing MCC indicators based on what MCC 
currently uses. Currently the MCC simply counts the number of "passes" a country has in each 
category regardless the relative scores. So, a country simply passes or fails.  2) create a model 
which  uses the same indicators as the MCC currently uses provides equal weighting to each 
indicator. The new model would standardize all the indicators (so they could be compared) 
and then sum up the standardized score for ALL indicators. The difference between this 
proposed model and the one the MCC currently uses is that the proposed model takes into 
account each indicator (even those a country failed). The rationale being that a difference 
between a marginal pass and a marginal fail is just that, marginal. However, currently the 
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MCC treat that marginal difference as an absolute difference where the proposed model 
compares it as a marginal difference. That is, a country who passes an indicator 100% of the 
time is rewarded more than a country who passes the same indicator 51% of the time in the 
proposed model, whereas currently the MCC would treat them the same, simply as a pass. On 
the same token, a country who passes a indicator 0% of the time is punished more than a 
country who passes 47% of the time, whereas currently the MCC would treat them the same, 
simply as a fail. The proposed model would seem to be an improvement over what the MCC 
is currently using in the sense it is more holistic.  The proposed index was created as an 
alternative to the current MCC funding mechanism (although it uses the same variables) in 
that it aggregates all scores into one; therefore countries that marginally fail some indicators 
but are well above the median for others are rewarded for the later and not punished as much 
for the former. This would seem to be what development is truly about, how well a country is 
performing in ALL facets of development not simply a counting exercise on how many facets 
they are above some fluid mean. The hypothesis of this study is that using the same social and 
economic development indicators the MCC currently utilizes but by aggregating and 
comparing one score across countries rather than simply counting the total number of 
indicators above the mean that funding decisions will differ. This is pertinent, since some 
countries (A) could marginally all fail of their indices which results in a "non funding" 
decision, whereas some countries (B) marginally pass some of their indices but fail the others 
relatively bad but obtain a "funding" decision. Thus the hypothesis of this thesis is that under 
the proposed index country (A) would not be punished as much for a marginal fail as country 
(B) would be for a relative bad fail and thus relative funding decisions may be altered under 
the new index.      
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These objectives may help certain institutions such as the MCC, which based on 
indicators measures to help developing countries, to take into consideration certain 
endogenous and exogenous factors to make their decisions for funding. How do these funding 
decisions matter for poverty reduction in developing countries? A poor country could have a 
good policy to reduce poverty, but could not receive funding because it was not above the 
median of the Control of Corruption indicator.  
This thesis is structured into five chapters. Following this introduction, the second 
chapter summarizes the literature review about the MCC, its methodology, and other studies 
or points of view which support or criticize what the MCC has done. It also offers more 
details about the way indicators are calculated and the methodology used by the other sources 
from which the MCC gets the scores for their indicators. Data and methodology for this thesis 
are explained in the third chapter. Data analysis is developed in the fourth chapter and results 
are presented. Finally, chapter fives presents a conclusion and underlines some suggestions 
for the MCC and for further research.  
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II.        LITTERATURE REVIEW 
While the first section of this thesis laid out the problem statement, the current chapter 
gives an overview about the MCC and its funding methodology. It then describes the 
seventeen MCC indicators and the sources they are derived from; and examines how each 
indicator is calculated and what the scoring process is. In reality, the MCC uses twenty four 
indicators instead of seventeen; this means that some sub-indicators have been combined to 
build a main indicator (see Figures 2.1 to 2.3). Additionally it will explore how the MCC 
weighs indicators based on exogenous work of each indices creator. For an empirical 
example, the scoring of the Republic of Niger will be brought out as an example for each 
indicator. This chapter will also identify and examine the criticisms of certain indicators. 
A. MCC’s Background 
The MCC is a U.S. government corporation, established in January 2004. First 
proposed by President George W. Bush in 2002, its purpose is to promote economic growth 
and reduce poverty in low- and middle-income countries through the development of country 
agreements called “compacts” with the U.S. government, an approach considered to be a new 
model for U.S. foreign assistance when first proposed. According to the MCC, a compact is a 
multi-year agreement between the MCC and an eligible country to fund specific programs 
targeted at reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth. Housed in the Executive 
Branch of the US Federal government, the MCC is led by a chief executive officer, who is a 
presidential appointee requiring Senate confirmation. The MCC is overseen by a board of 
directors, consisting of five ex officio members and four public members.1 Public members 
                                                 
1
 Ex officio members include the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, U.S. Trade 
Representative, USAID Administrator, and the MCC CEO. 
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are nominated by the President from names submitted by the majority and minority leaders of 
the House and Senate. The MCC provides development grants to a select group of low and 
middle-income countries (the former with per capita incomes below or equal $1,905 USD and 
the latter between $1,905 USD and $3,945 in 2011) that demonstrate a commitment to good 
governance by investing in the health and education of their people and adopting sound 
economic policies. First funded at $994 million USD in Fiscal Year 2004 (FY 2004), funding 
for the MCC reached its peak of $1.75 billion USD in FY 2006, was leveled off in  FY 2007, 
and has declined since then; FY 2009 funding was $875 million USD (Tarnoff, 2009). Table 
2.1 depicts the trends of the MCC appropriations from FY 2004 to FY 2011. The 
administration’s FY 2010 budget request includes $1.4 billion for the MCC (Tarnoff, 2010).  
The MCC disburses funds to eligible countries that apply for and are awarded assistance. To 
be eligible to apply to the MCC for “compact” funding, countries must pass a corruption 
indicator and score at or above the median on some of the other indicators (Tarnoff, 2010). 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, (2010), defined a corruption indicator as “capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests.” Candidate countries that do not meet these criteria may be eligible for “threshold” 
program assistance if they demonstrate commitment to improving their performance to reach 
eligibility for compacts. According to the MCC, a threshold program agreement is a contract 
between the United States and an eligible country through which the MCC provides financial 
assistance for targeted policy reform efforts. Threshold programs are typically smaller in 
dollar terms, shorter-term grants to help countries improve their performance on eligibility 
policy indicators. For instance, Burkina Faso received a threshold program in 2005 ($12.9 
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million USD) and given its progress it was rewarded a compact program in 2008 ($480.9 
million USD) (MCC, 2011b). The first compact grant was signed in 2005. To this early 2011, 
22 countries have been awarded compacts, totaling $7.9 billion USD (MCC, 2011b).2  
The first threshold program was signed in 2005, and to this early 2011, 23 countries 
have been awarded threshold assistance, totaling $494 million USD (MCC, 2011b)3. In 
February 2011, the Obama administration issued its FY 2012 budget, requesting $1.125 
billion USD for the MCC, a two percent increase from the enacted FY 2010 appropriation and 
a 25% increase over the final FY 2011 appropriation (Tarnoff, 2011). 
Table 2.1 
MCC Appropriations: Fiscal Year 2004-2011 (in 2011 Billion USD's) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
MCC funds requested by 
the President 1.3 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.225 1.4 1.3 
MCC funds appropriated by 
Congress 0.1 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.5 0.9 1.1 0.9 
Source: Tarnoff (2011). 
                                                 
2
 (Armenia($235.7 million USD), Benin($307.3 million USD), Burkina Faso($480.9 million 
USD), Cape Verde($110 million USD), El Salvador($460.9 million USD), Georgia($295.3 
million USD), Ghana($547 million USD), Honduras($215 million USD), Jordan ($275.1 million 
USD) Lesotho($362.6 million USD), Madagascar($109.8 million USD), Mali($460.8 million 
USD), Mongolia($284.9 million USD), Moldova ($262 million USD) Morocco($697.5 million 
USD), Mozambique($506.9 million USD), Namibia($304.5 million USD), Nicaragua($175 
million USD), Philippines ($434 million USD), Senegal($540 million USD), Tanzania($698 
million USD), Vanuatu($65.7 million USD)). 
3
 (Albania($13.9 million USD), Albania II ($15.7 million USD), Burkina Faso($12.9 million 
USD), Guyana($6.7 million USD), Indonesia($55 million USD), Jordan($25 million USD), 
Kenya($12.7 million USD), Kyrgyz Republic($16 million USD), Liberia($15.1 million USD), 
Malawi ($20.9 million USD), Moldova($24.7 million USD), Niger($23.1 million USD), 
Paraguay($34.6 million USD), Paraguay II($30.3 million USD)  Peru($36.6 million USD), 
Philippines($20.7 million USD), Rwanda($24.7 million USD), Sao Tome and Principe($7.4 
million USD), Timor-Leste ($10.5 million USD), Tanzania($11.2 million USD), Uganda($10.4 
million USD), Ukraine($45 million USD), Zambia($22.7 million USD)). 
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The MCC uses publicly available data developed by independent third parties, such as 
the World Bank, Freedom House, International Monetary Funds, UNICEF, United National 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, etc. to develop 
their indicators. The MCC chooses these because they are all linked to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. To select countries as eligible for funding, the MCC’s board of directors 
considers three factors: performance on the defined policy criteria, the opportunity to reduce 
poverty and generate economic growth in the country, and funds available to the MCC (MCC, 
2011a).  
B. The MCC Selection Process 
According to the MCC (2011a), there are four important steps in considering a county 
for MCC funding. These are described below. 
1. Identification of Candidate Countries 
The candidate countries are chosen based on their per capita GNI (must be low and 
low middle-income countries) and whether they are legally eligible to receive the U.S. 
economic assistance (they qualify only if they are not statutorily prohibited from receiving the 
U.S. economic assistance), (Table 7.1). The MCC then submits a report to Congress with a list 
of candidate countries prior to the selection of countries eligible for Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) assistance.   
Due to the fact that the range of per capita income varies from year to year, a country’s 
eligibility could be negatively affected by it moving from one income classification to another 
(Tarnoff, 2011). For instance, Tarnoff (2011) adds that Azerbaijan and Albania have moved 
from low middle-income to upper middle-income status and are, therefore, now ineligible for 
further MCC assistance. Countries in the low-income group compete with other countries in 
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the low-income group; and countries in the low middle- income group compete with each 
other (Tarnoff, 2011). In addition, in September 2009, the MCC Board announced that, for 
countries that move from low to low middle-income status, it will consider their performance 
relative to both their former income group and the newer one for a period of three years 
(Tarnoff, 2009). That could be an advantage/disadvantage for other countries in the each of 
the classifications. That is, if a low-income country was reclassified as a low middle-income 
country theoretically the mean for the entire group would fall thus bumping some countries 
over the mean. Conversely, if a low middle-income country was reclassified as a low income 
country then theoretically the mean of the indicators in the low-income bracket should 
increase thus bumping some countries marginally below the mean. Countries that move from 
low-income to lower-middle-income status may be affected negatively by having to compete 
against countries at a higher level of development (Tarnoff, 2011). 
2. Publication of the MCC’s Selection Criteria and Methodology 
After submitting a report to Congress, the MCC holds a formal public comment period 
following publication of the report. To be considered eligible, a country should perform above 
the median in relation to its peers (income group) on at least half of the indicators in the 
Ruling Justly and Economic categories, above the median on at least three of the five 
indicators in the Investing in People category (Immunization Rates, Public Expenditures on 
Health, Girls’ Primary Education Completion Rate, Public Expenditure on Primary Education, 
Natural Resources Management), and above the median on the control of corruption indicator. 
There is no median for inflation, but it must be under a fixed ceiling of 15% annually.  
However this ceiling is flexible, in FY2004, when the inflation rate ceiling was 20% only 6 of 
the 63 candidate countries failed the test, so the MCC lowered the inflation rate to 15% in 
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order to make the test more difficult (Tarnoff, 2011). Tarnoff (2011) also adds that the MCC 
Board can take into consideration whether a country performs substantially below the median 
on any indicator; it may exercise discretion for the final list of eligible countries. It can also 
take into consideration other quantitative and qualitative information such as recent policy 
changes or positive trend lines. Besides the corruption indicator, this could be a subjective 
way to endorse funding to countries. For instance, Cape Verde scored poorly on the Trade 
Policy indicator, but the Board considered the country’s progress towards joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and implementing a value added tax to reduce reliance on import 
tariffs (Tarnoff, 2011).  
3. Publication of the MCC Scorecards 
The MCC publishes country performance “scorecards” on its website (www.mcc.gov) 
for all candidate countries.4 
4. Selection of Compact-Eligible and Threshold-Eligible Countries 
      Compact-eligible countries are then chosen from the pool of candidate countries by the 
MCC board. The MCC compacts are grant agreements, no more than five-years in length (as 
required by the MCC authorization), proposed and implemented by countries selected by the 
MCC Board. In other words after being eligible, a given country should come to the MCC 
with a proposal for funding. According to Tarnoff (2011) 36% of the MCC compact funding 
was in the transport sector, predominately roads; 20% was targeted on agriculture; 9% on 
health, education, and community services; 9% on water supply and sanitation; 8% on energy; 
4% on governance, and 2% on financial services. Of all 22 compact countries to date, 58% of 
                                                 
4
  For more details please read: http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/scorecards  
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compact funding has gone to sub-Saharan African countries, 12% to North Africa and the 
Middle East, 10% to the former Soviet Union, 10% to Latin America, and 10% to Asia and 
the Pacific (Tarnoff, 2011). 
Just because a country passes the requisite number of qualifying indicators does not 
mean that it will be selected for compact eligibility since the MCC board does not depend on 
indicator scores alone for selection (Tarnoff, 2011).This is important, in essence it says that 
the MCC is writing their own caveats on ways either to fund or not to fund countries that fail 
or pass their index. The Board can consider other information but it is not required to divulge 
it. For instance, Tarnoff (2011) states that in FY2006, Bhutan, China, and Vietnam passed 
enough indicators but were not chosen based on very low scores on political rights and civil 
liberties; Uganda passed 12 of the 17 indicators and did not fall significantly below the 
median on the other four, but was not selected for unexplained reasons. Tarnoff (2011), says 
the MCC accepts that the indicators themselves are imperfect measures of a country’s policies 
and performance because they suffer from lag time, reflecting when the raw data was derived 
as much as a year or more previously; or a country’s position vis-a-vis its peers could also 
fluctuate considerably from year to year without reflecting any significant change in the 
country’s policies. Tarnoff (2001), explains this imperfection was a function of three reasons: 
1) countries with good policies might fall behind the performance criteria while other 
countries are making progress, thus raising the bar; 2) any shift from the low income to lower- 
middle income group could alter a country’s relative scores since it would competes with 
countries more likely to achieve better indicators; 3) countries may fail when new criteria are 
introduced.    
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Also, Tarnoff (2011) states that the MCC Board has the right to select countries to 
participate in the Threshold Program which support targeted policy reform efforts. In other 
words, countries in this program might receive modest funds for programs designed to 
improve indicator performance that might make it eligible for a future MCC compact.. For 
instance in FY2005, 19 countries were awarded threshold assistance, totaling $470 million 
(Tarnoff, 2011). So far 23 threshold programs worth a total of about $494 million have been 
awarded, two of which have received second programs (Albania and Paraguay) (Tarnoff, 
2011). 
C. Indicators Used by the MCC 
  According to the MCC (2011), there are seven primary reasons why the MCC chose 
these indicators. Indicators should 1) be developed by an independent third party, 2) utilize an 
analytically-rigorous methodology and objective with high-quality data, 3) be publicly 
available, 4) have broad country-coverage and are comparable across countries, 5) have a 
clear theoretical or empirical link to economic growth and poverty reduction, 6) be policy-
linked, i.e. measure factors that governments can influence within a two to three year horizon, 
and 7) have broad consistency in results from year to year. 
The MCC uses seventeen indicators throughout three broad policy dimensions, which 
are reviewed annually by the MCC Board based on their performance. In reality, the MCC 
uses twenty four indicators instead of seventeen; this means that some sub-indicators have 
been combined to build a main indicator (see Figures 2.1 to 2.3). 
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Figure 2.1 
Indicators Used in the MCC’s Ruling Justly Category 
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Figure 2.2 
Indicators Used in the MCC’s Investing in People Category 
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Figure 2.3 
Indicators Used in the MCC’s Encouraging Economic Freedom Category 
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1.         Ruling Justly 
This first broad policy dimension includes six indicators: Civil Liberties, Political 
Rights, Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Voice and 
Accountability (Figure 2.1). A country needs to pass three of the six indicators to be eligible 
for the MCC funding. The sources of these six indicators are provided by Freedom House and 
World Bank/Brookings Institution WGI. The MCC (2011b) states that the six indicators have 
been chosen based on several distinct reasons. First, civil liberties can promote economic 
growth by reducing social conflict, removing legal impediments to participation in the 
economy, encouraging adherence to the rule of law, enhancing protection of property rights, 
increasing economic rates of return on government projects, and reducing the risk of project 
failure, according to some studies. Second, democratic institutions are better at reducing 
economic volatility and provide a more consistent approach to poverty reduction than do 
autocratic regimes, thus political rights are important. Third, corruption hinders economic 
growth by increasing costs, lowering productivity, discouraging investment, reducing 
confidence in public institutions, limiting the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, weakening systems of public financial management, and undermining investments 
in health and education. It can also increase poverty by slowing economic growth, skewing 
government expenditure in favor of the rich and well-connected, concentrating public 
investment in unproductive projects, promoting a more regressive tax system, siphoning funds 
away from essential public services, adding a higher level of risk to the investment decisions 
of low-income individuals, and reinforcing patterns of unequal asset ownership, thereby 
limiting the ability of the poor to borrow and increase their income. Fourth, countries with 
more effective governments tend to achieve higher levels of economic growth by obtaining 
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higher credit ratings and attracting more investment, offering higher quality public services 
and encouraging higher levels of human capital accumulation, putting foreign aid resources to 
better use, accelerating technological innovation, and increasing the productivity of 
government spending. 
Fifth, business environments characterized by consistent policies and credible rules, such as 
secure property rights and contract enforceability, create higher levels of investment and 
growth. Finally, improving public participation and democratic accountability can foster an 
environment conducive to economic growth by reducing corruption, constraining 
opportunistic and discretionary behavior, improving the efficiency and responsiveness of 
public institutions, expanding investor protections, encouraging political stability and social 
trust, and building respect for the rule of law and property rights. 
2.        Investing in People 
Investing in People is the second board policy dimension and includes five indicators. 
A country needs to pass at least three of the five indicators to be eligible for MCC funding. 
The MCC has chosen these indicators because of their correlation with economic and poverty 
reduction. First,   immunization rates (the national Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT3) 
vaccination rate and the measles (MCV): the MCC (2011b) considers that healthy workers are 
more economically productive and more likely to save and invest; healthy children are more 
likely to reach higher levels of educational attainment; and healthy parents are better able to 
invest in the health and education of their children. It also added that immunization programs 
also increase labor productivity among the poor; reduce spending to cope with illnesses, and 
lower mortality and morbidity among the main income-earners in poor families. Second, 
public expenditure on health: the MCC (2011b) implies that increased spending on health, 
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when coupled with good policies and good governance, can promote growth, reduce poverty, 
and trigger declines in infant, child, and maternal mortality. Third, girls’ primary education 
completion rate: According to the MCC (2011b) empirical research consistently shows a 
strong positive correlation between girls’ primary education and accelerated economic 
growth, slower population growth, higher wages, increased agricultural yields, and increased 
labor productivity. Fourth, public expenditure on primary education (general government 
expenditure on primary education as a percentage of total government expenditure which 
includes the consolidated outlays of all levels of government): the MCC (2011b) stated that, 
for given levels of quality, well-managed and well-executed government spending on primary 
education can improve educational attainment and increase economic growth; and regions that 
begin with higher levels of education generally see a larger poverty impact of economic 
growth. Finally, natural resource management: sustainable natural resource management 
facilitates long- term economic growth by providing essential ecosystem services such as 
fertile soil, clean air and water, renewable energy, and genetic diversity (MCC, 2011b).   
3.        Encouraging Economic Freedom 
Encouraging Economic Freedom is the third broad policy dimension contains six 
indicators     (Figure 2.3). A country needs to pass at least three of the six indicators be 
eligible for MCC funding. The MCC has chosen these indicators because of their correlation 
with economic growth and poverty reduction. First, business start-up: the MCC (2011b) states 
that easing business entry into the formal economy can reduce unemployment, encourage 
investment, expand the tax base, help small entrepreneurs to access bank credit, allow workers 
to enjoy health insurance and pension benefits, and enable businesses to achieve economies of 
scale. Second, land rights and access: Secure land tenure plays a central role in the economic 
  
 
21 
 
growth process by giving people long-term incentives to invest and save their income, 
enhancing access to essential public services, allowing for more productive use of time and 
money than protecting land rights, facilitating use of land as collateral for loans, and 
contributing to social stability and local governance (MCC, 2011b). Third, trade policy: Trade 
openness can help accelerate long run economic growth by allowing for greater economic 
specialization, encouraging investment and increasing productivity. One study estimates that 
“open” economies on average register 2.2% higher economic growth than “closed” economies 
(MCC, 2011b).  
Fourth, regulatory quality: Good regulatory policies help the poor by creating opportunities 
for entrepreneurship, reducing opportunities for corruption, increasing the quality of public 
services, and improving the functioning of the housing, service, and labor markets on which 
they rely (MCC, 2011b). Filth, inflation: high inflation creates an environment of risk and 
uncertainty, drives down the rate of investment, and is often associated with distorted relative 
prices and tax incentives. Inflation can also hinder financial market development and create 
incentives for corruption (MCC, 2011b). Finally, fiscal policy: fiscal deficits driven by current 
expenditures decrease national savings and put upward pressure on real interest rates, which 
can lead to a crowding out of private sector activity; and they either force governments to 
increase tax rates, reducing the capital available for domestic investment, or to increase the 
stock of public debt (MCC, 2011b). 
D.      The Sources of Indicators Used by the MCC 
1.       Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)/World Bank:  
Established in 1944, the World Bank is a source of financial and technical assistance 
to developing countries around the world. Owned by 187 member countries of the 
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International Bank of Reconstruction and Development  (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA), its mission is to fight poverty and to help people help 
themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building 
capacity and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors (WGI/World Bank, 2011). 
The World Bank obtains its funding from its formal members. The World Bank provides low-
interest loans, interest-free credits and grants to developing countries for a wide array of 
purposes that include investments in education, health, public administration, infrastructure, 
financial and private sector development, agriculture and environmental and natural resource 
management.5 It provides five indicators to the MCC (Control of Corruption, Government 
Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, and Regulatory Quality). 
2.     Freedom House  
Freedom House was established in 1941 in New York City.  It emerged from an 
amalgamation of two groups that had been formed, with the encouragement of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, to encourage popular support for American involvement in World War 
II (Freedom House, 2011a). It continues to serve as a leading advocate for policies to advance 
the democratic idea; and it was a founder of the Community of Democracies, an alliance of 
global democracies that seeks a greater voice for democracy at the United Nations and other 
international forums (Freedom House, 2011a).  Freedom House supports critical reforms of 
the United Nations to make its work in human rights and democracy more effective and it is a 
voice for a U.S. foreign policy that places the promotion of democracy at the forefront 
(Freedom House website). Its flagship survey, Freedom in the World, was chosen as a formal 
                                                 
5
 For detailed information please read : 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:3
6602~theSitePK:29708,00.html 
  
 
23 
 
source for the determination of country eligibility for MCC, and it gets funding from 
donation.6 It provides two indicators to the MCC (Civil Liberties and Political Rights). 
3. World Health Organizations (WHO) 
WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations 
system, and it is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the 
health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy 
options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and assessing health trends.7 
It gets funding from its member states and voluntary contributions. It provides two indicators 
to the MCC (Immunization rate and Health Expenditures). 
4. United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
UNESCO works to create the conditions for dialogue among civilizations, cultures and 
peoples, based upon respect for commonly shared values (UNESCO, 2011). Its mission is to 
contribute to the building of peace, the eradication of poverty, sustainable development and 
intercultural dialogue through education, the sciences, culture, communication and 
information.8 It gets funding from its member states and donations. The UNESCO provides 
two indicators to the MCC (Public Expenditure on Primary School and Girls’ Primary 
Education Completion). 
 5. Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) CIESIN was 
established in 1989 as an independent non-governmental organization to provide information 
that would help scientists, decision-makers, and the public better understand the changing 
relationship between human beings and the environment (CIESIN, 2011). It works at the 
                                                 
6
 For detailed information please read: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=249 
7
 For detailed information please read: http://www.who.int/about/en/ 
8
 For detailed information please read: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/ 
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intersection of the social, natural, and information sciences, and specializes in on-line data and 
information management, spatial data integration and training, and interdisciplinary research 
related to human interactions in the environment, and its mission is to provide access to and 
enhance the use of information worldwide, advancing understanding of human interactions in 
the environment and serving the needs of science and public and private decision making.9 It 
gets funding from grants, contracts and collaborations, international organizations, 
foundations, centers, and departments within Columbia University. 
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP): The Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy seeks to advance cutting edge environmental thinking and 
policy analysis so that decision-making in the public, business, community, and personal 
realms promotes sustainability (YCELP, 2011). Specifically, the center seeks to: train future 
environmental leaders by encouraging innovative thinking and rigorous analysis; identify 
pressing environmental problems and advance effective policies, strategies, and decision-
making tools in response; move the environmental debate beyond political and sectored 
boundaries to enable integrated approaches to problem-solving; identify scientific and 
technological advances that can ease uncertainty and respond to the complexity of 
environmental protection; and cultivate a greater understanding of stakeholder attitudes, 
values, and behavior toward environmental policy choices and how these diverse perspectives 
affect policy outcomes.10 The CIESIN/YCELP provides one indicator to the MCC (Natural 
Resource Management). 
 
                                                 
9
 For detailed information please read: http://www.ciesin.org/aboutus.html 
10
 For detailed information please read: http://envirocenter.yale.edu/about-the-center/history 
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6. World Economic Outlook (WEO)/International Monetary Fund (IMF)   
 The World Economic Outlook (WEO) presents the IMF staff's analysis and projections 
of economic developments at the global level, in major country groups (classified by region, 
stage of development, etc.), and in many individual countries (IMF, 2011). It focuses on major 
economic policy issues as well as on the analysis of economic developments and prospects. It 
is usually prepared twice a year, as documentation for meetings of the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee, and forms the main instrument of the IMF's global surveillance 
activities.11 IMF gets funding mainly from its members states. The WEO/IMF provides two 
indicators to the MCC (Inflation and Fiscal Policy). 
7. International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
 The IFC fosters sustainable economic growth in developing countries by financing 
private sector investment, mobilizing capital in the international financial markets, and 
providing advisory services to businesses and governments; also, it helps companies and 
financial institutions in emerging markets create jobs, generate tax revenues, improve 
corporate governance and environmental performance, and contribute to their local 
communities (IFC, 2011). The goal is to improve lives, especially for the people who most 
need the benefits of growth.12 It gets funding from donor governments, other foundations and 
companies. The IFC provides two indicators to the MCC (Business Start-up and Land Rights 
and Access). 
 
                                                 
11
 For detailed information please read: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29 
12
 For detailed information please read: 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc/v
ision 
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8. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
 IFAD is a specialized agency of the United Nations. It was established as an 
international financial institution in 1977 as one of the major outcomes of the 1974 World 
Food Conference which was organized in response to the food crises of the early 1970s that 
primarily affected the Sahelian countries of Africa; and its mission is to enable poor rural 
people to overcome poverty (IFAD, 2011). Working with rural poor people, governments, 
donors, non-governmental organizations and many other partners, IFAD focuses on country-
specific solutions, which can involve increasing rural poor peoples' access to financial 
services, markets, technology, land and other natural resources.13 It gets funding from its 
formal member states. The IFAD provides one sub-indicator to the MCC (Access to Land).  
 9. Heritage Foundation 
 The Heritage Foundation was founded in 1973. It is a research and educational 
institution whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on 
the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American 
values, and a strong national defense.14 It gets funding from its memberships and donations. 
The Heritage Foundation provides one indicator to the MCC (Trade Policy). 
As a case study of the MCC's indicators the country of the Republic of Niger will be 
analyzes. The Republic of Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world that has benefited 
from the MCC threshold program in 2008. Niger will be used in the remaining portion of this 
chapter as a case study to interpret each of the indicators used by the MCC.  
 
                                                 
13
 For detailed information please read: http://www.ifad.org/governance/index.htm 
14
 For detailed information please read: http://www.heritage.org/about 
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E. The Republic of Niger Economic Overview 
The Republic of Niger is a landlocked country (490,000 sq mi, about three times the 
size of California) with an estimated population of 16.4 million in July 2011 (CIA, 2011), the 
majority of whom live along a narrow band of arable land (15% of the Republic of Niger 
land) in the south of the country (U.S. Department of State, 2011). The Republic of Niger’s 
reliance on rain fed agriculture, mining, and official development assistance (45% of the 
Republic of Niger’s budget), make it highly vulnerable to climatic fluctuations, locust 
invasions, changes in global demand and prices for its mineral exports, well as well as 
fluctuations in donor financing (World Bank, 2011).   These vulnerabilities are reflected in 
large year to year fluctuations in economic growth, exports, and government revenue and 
expenditures; and with a large share of households living near or below the poverty line 
(34.1%), negative shocks translate directly into households not being able to cover basic needs 
and exposing them to hunger and malnutrition and inability to build human capital though 
education and adequate health care and nutrition (World Bank, 2011).  
  Besides food crises, the prolonged political crisis also threatens the continued flow of 
much needed donor assistance; and with official development assistance financing about 45% 
of the Republic of Niger’s budget, a sustained decline in development assistance would 
threaten existing progress that has been made in recent years to increase access to health and 
education (World Bank, 2011). In 2009, the Republic of Niger was ranked last (182 out of 182 
countries) on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index 
(World Bank, 2011). In the mining sector, the Republic of Niger is only partially benefitting 
from the upward trend in uranium prices, as a large share of its uranium export are sold at 
fixed prices (World Bank, 2011).   
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The Government’s Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which was 
approved by decree on October 10, 2007, included seven pillars: (1) strong, diversified, 
sustainable and job-creating growth; (2) equitable access to quality social services; (3) 
addressing the demographic challenge; (4) reduction of inequalities and strengthening of 
social protection for the vulnerable groups; (5) infrastructure development; (6) promotion of 
good governance; and (7) effective implementation of the strategy (World Bank, 2011).  
Based on its PRSP, the government (Mamadou Tandja’s) made a range of critical 
reforms which include a focus on macro-economic and debt sustainability, strengthening of 
public expenditure and debt management, the transparent management of mining revenue, 
restructuring and privatization of state owned enterprises, increasing access to social services, 
measures to manage the rate of population growth, and enhancing the environment for private 
sector activities, especially in the agriculture sector (World Bank, 2011).  
According to World Bank, 2011, in April 2004, the Republic of Niger reached the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point and received debt relief from 
International Development Association (IDA), including topping-up, equivalent to $142 
million (USD). The country also qualified for $300 million (USD) in debt relief from the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI); and a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was approved by 
the Fund’s Board in May 2008 for a total amount of $23 million (USD) (World Bank, 2011). 
The third review was completed by the IMF’s Board in February 2010, allowing a 
disbursement of about US$5 million (World Bank, 2011).  
In 2008, the Republic of Niger benefited from the MCC’s threshold program which is 
designed to assist the Republic of Niger improve its performance on the policy areas 
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measured by the Control of Corruption, Land Rights, Business Start-Up and Girls’ Primary 
School Education indicators used on MCC’s scorecard (MCC, 2011c). The $23.1 million 
(USD) threshold program mainly focused on improving the quality of and access to education 
for girls and by improving local governance and reducing corruption through increased 
through civil society engagement, improved business start-up procedures tax codes, and 
revised trade laws (MCC, 2011c). The MCC’s Board of Directors suspended the Republic of 
Niger threshold program, effective December 31, 2009, due to political events that were 
inconsistent with the criteria used to determine a country’s eligibility for MCC assistance.   
F. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) includes six indicators of broad dimensions of 
governance covering over 200 countries since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.  It defines governance based on these six indicators. 
Thus, governance is: “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). The same authors 
defined each indicator as following: 
1.     Voice and Accountability  
 Voice and Accountability is described as “capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
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expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2010). 
Figure 2.4 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Voice and Accountability (1996-2009) 
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                   Source: WGI (2011). 
As a case study the Republic of will be used to highlight and interpret all of the 
indictors. Figure 2.4 shows that Niger made progress in Voice and Accountability between 
2000 and 2005. However, the Republic of Niger’s scores in Voice and Accountability started 
decreasing since 2005. It only worsened in 2009 when the government of Mamadou Tandja 
changed the constitution of the Republic of Niger in order to stay in power after his second 
term. This is one of the reasons why in 2010, the Republic of Niger experienced a military 
coup in order to bring back democracy in the Republic of Niger.  
2.       Government Effectiveness 
 Government Effectiveness is defined as “capturing perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
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pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
Figure 2.5 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Government Effectiveness (1996-2009) 
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                  Source: WGI (2011). 
Figure 2.5 shows the impact of the policy that the government implemented since the 
presidential election of 2004. In other words, since 2004 improved services were provided to 
public. 
3.       Regulatory Quality 
 Regulatory Quality can be defined as “capturing perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
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Figure 2.6 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Regulatory Quality (1996-2009) 
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                  Source: WGI (2011). 
Figure 2.6 shows since 2000, the Republic of Niger was making progress. However, it 
needs to strengthen regulatory environment that encourages local and foreign investors. 
4.       Rule of Law 
Rule of law is defined as “capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
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Figure 2.7 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Rule of Law (1996-2009) 
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                 Source: WGI (2011). 
Figure 2.7 shows that between 2002 and 2007, the Republic of Niger did not make a 
significant progress concerning the rule of law. However, there is a progress between 2008 
and 2009.  
5.        Control of Corruption 
Control of Corruption is defined as “capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2010). 
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Figure 2.8 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Control of Corruption (1996-2009) 
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                Source: WGI (2011). 
Figure 2.8 shows since 2003, the Republic of Niger made improvements to increase 
their corruption indicator. It also tells us it is a long run process to fight against corruption in 
the Republic of Niger since the progress is very slow. The Republic of Niger needs to 
strengthen its policies in order to be above the median. 
These five indicators (Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) come from 31 different data 
sources and include several hundred variables. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010, stated 
that data are collected through surveys of firms and households, commercial business 
information providers, non-governmental organizations, multilateral organizations and other 
public sector. Each of the data sources are chosen to provide a set of empirical proxies for the 
indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). For example, a cross-country household 
or firm survey might provide information about respondents’ perceptions or experiences with 
corruption, while a NGO or commercial data provider might provide its own assessments of 
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corruption based on its network of respondents (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). The 
WGI combine these different measures of corruption into a composite indicator that 
summarizes their common component (MCC, 2011). The same process is done for each 
indicator.15 In a few cases data sources are updated by WGI only once every two to three 
years.  The data sources are available annually reflect the perceptions of diverse group of 
responds and new data sources can be introduced or dropped, depending on the situation 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). The WGI data sources reflect the perceptions of 
different types of respondents, and several are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with 
first‐hand knowledge of the governance situation in the country (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2010). These include the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report, the Institute for Management Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, the 
World Bank / EBRD’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance surveys, the Gallup 
World Poll, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometro, and the Americasbarometer (Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi, 2010).   
Additionally, WGI takes into consideration the views of country analysts at the major 
multilateral development agencies (the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank), 
reflecting these individuals’ in‐depth experience working on the countries they assess; and 
together with some expert assessments provided by the United States Department of State and 
France’s Ministry of Finance, Industry and Employment, WGI classifies these as "Public 
Sector Data Providers" in (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
                                                 
15
 For further details: www.govindicators.org 
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A number of data sources provided by various Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), such as Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House, and the Bertelsmann 
Foundation, are also included; and WGI considers certain types of data from commercial 
business information providers, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, and 
Political Risk Services (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010).  
Of the 31 data sources used in 2009, five are from commercial business information 
providers; surveys and NGOs contribute nine sources each; and the remaining eight sources 
are from public sector providers (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2010), add that the largest surveys of WGI are Global Competitiveness Report 
survey and the Gallup World Poll each cover around 130 countries, but several regional 
surveys cover necessarily smaller sets of countries.  The majority of the data sources from 
Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders are simply reproduced by WGI, and several 
other sources provided by commercial risk rating agencies and commercial survey 
organizations are purchased (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
6. Scorings Process16 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), state that the WGI rescales all the individual 
variables to run from zero to one by using the statistical approach called Unobserved 
Components Model (UCM). For WGI each of the individual data sources provides an 
imperfect signal of some deeper underlying notion of governance that is difficult to observe 
directly.  How do they isolate an informative signal about the unobserved governance 
                                                 
16
 The scoring process is clearly explained by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi in their book 
“World Governance Indicators, Methodology and Analytical Issues”, 2010 or Kaufmann D., 
Kraay A.and Mastruzzi M., 2005: “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-
2004”. 
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component common to each individual data source, and how do they optimally combine the 
many data sources to get the best possible signal of governance in a country based on all the 
available data?( Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). WGI believes that the UCM could 
help them to deal with this signal extraction problem, and considers that UCM produces the 
point estimates for governance for every country, also provides an estimate of the margins of 
error for each individual source as well as for each of the composite governance indicators for 
each country (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010).  In other words, it expresses the 
observed data as a linear function of unobserved governance plus a disturbance term capturing 
perception errors and/or sampling variation in each indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999). They assume that true governance has a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one, and that the error term has a zero mean (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2005). The main advantage of the model is that it allows WGI to obtain estimates of the 
variance of the disturbance term of each indicator; and then compute the mean of the 
conditional distribution of governance given the observed data for each country as a natural 
point estimate of the level of governance in that country; it is just a simply weighted average 
of the rescaled scores for each country (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
Since WGI also knows that each of the sources of governance data uses different units 
to measure governance, they re-orient data from each source so that higher values correspond 
to better outcomes, and rescale each indicator by subtracting the minimum possible score and 
dividing by the difference between the maximum and the minimum scores, so that each 
indicator is on a possible scale from zero to one (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 
1999). 
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For each of the components of governance defined above, Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) assume that the observed score of country j on indicator k, yjk, as a linear 
function of unobserved governance in country j, gj, and a disturbance term, εjk, as follows 
 (1)           yjk =  αk +  βk (gj + εjk ) 
where  αk and βk are parameters which map unobserved governance  in country j, gj, due to the 
fact that different sources use different units to measure governance. Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) also assume that gj is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero 
and variance of one as well as the error terms with mean zero and variance that is the same 
across countries, but differs across indicators, i.e. V[εjk] = αk2; and these error terms are 
independent across sources. The weights assigned to each source k are given by   
           (2)             wk = αk-2/1+ k-2 
 which means a more informative signal of governance receive higher weight. 
The WGI recognizes that there is imprecision due to the fact that available data are imperfect 
proxies and the margins of error provide users to take this imprecision into consideration 
when comparing countries over time (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). It also assumes 
that “changes in countries’ relative positions are unlikely to be very different from changes 
over time in countries’ absolute positions” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
In brief, measures are reported either in the standard normal units of the governance 
indicator, ranging from ‐2.5 to 2.5,  with higher values corresponding to better governance, or 
in percentile rank terms ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries 
worldwide (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). 
 It is important to note that, the WGI’ s methodology has been the subject of criticisms 
due to the fact that there are problems in the interpretation of data as well as various biases in 
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perceptions data on  governance. Despite criticisms against the WGI’s indicators, there are 
many users (academics and policymakers) such as the MCC which based their decisions on 
these indicators to make countries eligible for development funding (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2007). 
The MCC adjusts the median for low-income countries (LICs) and low middle-income 
countries (LMICs) to zero for all of the WGI; and country scores are calculated by taking the 
difference between actual scores and the median (MCC, 2011). The MCC (2011d) states that 
if the unadjusted median for LICs on Voice and Accountability is -0.70, in order to set the 
median at zero, the MCC simply adds 0.70 to each country’s score. For instance, the Republic 
of Niger’s Voice and Accountability score, which was originally -0.698, has been adjusted to 
0.002 (0.70 + (-0.698) = 0.002). 
  Note that one of the main indicators of MCC “Control of Corruption is the “hard” 
hurdle in the selection process, meaning a country must score above the 50th percentile to be 
eligible (Amy & Sheila, 2008). The indicator for corruption is a “pass/fail” test: should a 
country fall below the median on the corruption indicator, it will be disqualified from 
consideration unless other, more recent trends suggest otherwise (MCC, 2011b). 
  The indicators used by the World Bank Institute’s (WBI) Governance Indicators are 
called the CCI (Control of Corruption Indicator) which is directly comparable with the CPI 
(Corruption Perceptions Indicators) developed by the NGO Transparency International. Table 
2.2 below shows the differences between the CPI and CCI.  
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Table 2.2 
Differences between the Corruption Perceptions Indicator and the Control of Corruption 
Indicator 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI)/NGO Transparency International 
Control of Corruption (CCI)/World Bank 
- At least three different data base 
sources have to exist for a country to 
be included in the index. 
- It uses 31 different data sources and several 
hundred variables. 
- For a given year, the information on 
the three previous years is taken into 
consideration and treated as if it came 
from independent sources. 
- It uses only the indicators for the year in 
question, hence better reflecting changes 
from one year to the next. 
- It standardizes to run on an ordered 
scale of 0 (maximum corruption) to 10 
(minimum corruption). 
- It standardizes quantitative measure 
(standard normal variable) giving rise to a 
scale generally ranging from –2.5 (high level 
of corruption) to +2.5 (minimum level). 
 Source: Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006). 
A country could fail the corruption hurdle last year and pass it this year and vice-versa, 
depending on experts’ opinions used by the World Bank Institute’s (WBI) Global. Also, it is 
important to note that a bad government’s policy could affect a new good government 
program. Data lag on many of the indicators in a given year consider policies undertaken one 
or two years earlier (Hewko, 2010). In this case instead of judging a country on the speed and 
quantity of disbursements, the MCC could consider innovations and greater risk in the design 
and implementation of long term programs that focus on economic growth (Hewko, 2010).  
 In the study “The Cause of Corruption: A Cross-National Study” conducted by 
Treisman in 1998, it was confirmed that there is a correlation between higher perceived 
corruption and lower investment and growth. The more corrupt a country is, the less 
developed it will be. However, there is an exception that corruption is not correlated to 
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economic growth. For instance, Bangladesh scored poorly on most cross-country assessments 
of corruption, yet has managed to turn in impressive growth performance over the past decade 
(WGI, 2007). Rapid modernization could increase corruption, and corruption itself might 
inhibit rapid modernization (Treisman, 1998). A bad government, political instability 
(alternate military coups and presidential elections), and civil wars could definitely contribute 
to enhance corruption in a given country. Treisman (1998) regroups the causes of corruption 
into three mains areas: historical and cultural aspects, economic aspects and political aspects.   
Historically and culturally speaking, Triesman (1998) states that “in nearly all Asian 
countries there has always been a tradition of corruption.”A country background has to be 
considered when weighing its corruption indicator. Treisman (1998), states that countries that 
were former British colonies were perceived as significantly less corrupt than countries that 
had been colonized by other powers, but not more or less than a country that had never been 
colonized. Based on this result, a country other than a British colony would have more 
difficulty in receiving  funding, and reducing the level of corruption would be a long run 
challenge without external support. That is why, instead of “failing” or “passing” the 
eligibility criteria, this study is going to explore other factors that might be taken into 
consideration to improve the current method for funding eligibility. 
Economically speaking, bribery could have different meaning depending on where it is 
used. In underdeveloped countries “a bribe to a person holding a public position is not 
different from gifts” (Treisman, 1998). However, funding given by business companies to 
support presidential election in developed countries in order to access to some privilege is 
called “lobbying.” Corruption is defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain” 
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(Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006). That means both “gifts” and “lobby” are used for the 
same purpose, but users considered them different just by changing words. 
Politically speaking, the structure of a government could enhance corruption. For 
instance, “decentralized political systems are more corruptible, because the potential corrupter 
needs to influence only a segment of the government, and because in a fragment system there 
are fewer centralized forces and agencies to enforce honesty” (Treisman, 1998). Treisman also 
adds whatever the nature of government; the level of corruption is determined by the policies 
adopted by this power. “Within a corrupt environment, people adjust their strategies 
accordingly and contribute to the general acceptance of the phenomenon, thus making it 
routine” (World Bank, 2010). Based on these factors, Treisman (1998) concludes that the 
relationships among variables (economic growth, GDP, total investment, private or public 
expenditure, international trade, foreign investment and capital flows, inflation, etc.) are too 
complex that it will be difficult to find efficient instruments for their analysis. According to 
Triesman (1998), while the corruption is frequent in federal countries, it is possible that the 
competition between jurisdictions reduces the size of bribes. In addition, he suggested that to 
deal with these complex relationships among variables, further work with new data and a 
broader search for appropriate instruments need to be done in order to avoid the controversial 
conclusions of some factors such as the influence of democratic institutions and the extent of 
state intervention.  
As previously mentioned, corruption is based on experts’ opinion; the question 
Treisman (1998) poses then arises is all corruption equal? For instance, Razafindrakoto and 
Roubaud (2006) imply that if a construction company bribes a government to get a 
contracting job, is that the same as a doctor bribing his way into a government run university? 
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That is why they conclude that there are ideological biases when experts tend to rank 
countries based on their own political preferences. What happens when experts underestimate 
or overestimate the real level of corruption? When there is underestimation, the population of 
the lowest income countries would be hit by “triple whammy”: the whammy of their leaders, 
the whammy of the application of the principle of selectivity and the whammy of the 
underestimation of the governance indicators in the application of aid selectivity 
(Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006). In their 2006 study, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 
found that the experts’ estimations of petty corruption have nothing to do with the reality; 
therefore cannot be used as a satisfactory proxy for the objective phenomenon. They added 
the more poorly a country scores in the international databases, the higher the experts’ 
overestimation. So why does the MCC focus mainly on this indicator which is based on 
subjective perceptions? Suppose two countries A and B. Country A is “not corrupt”; however, 
after getting funding, this country is becoming more and more corrupt according to MCC. In 
contrast, country B is “corrupt” according to MCC, but is consistently making improvements 
to become less corrupt. In this case what would be the preferable funding choice? Chose a 
country based on its result on corruption for a given year or chose a country based on the 
progress it is making to get out of the corruption. 
G.       Freedom House’s Indicators 
The Freedom House index gives annual estimates on a country’s opportunity to act 
spontaneously in a variety of fields mostly outside the control of the government and other 
centers of potential domination throughout two categories: political rights and civil liberties. 
“Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right 
to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join 
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political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on 
public policies and are accountable to the electorate” (Freedom House, 2011a). “Civil liberties 
allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule 
of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state” (Freedom House, 2011a). 
The methodology of the survey is based on Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
standards of political rights and civil liberties. The survey rates the rights and social freedoms 
enjoyed by individuals, and it includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings for 193 
countries and 15 select territories (Freedom House, 2011a). 
1. Ratings Process  
According to the Freedom House (2007), the ratings process is based on a checklist of 
10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are 
grouped into the three sub-categories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and 
Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions are 
grouped into four sub-categories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), 
Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights (4). The highest number of points that can be awarded to the political rights 
checklist is 40 (or a total of up to 4 points for each of the 10 questions). The highest number 
of points that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total of up to 4 points 
for each of the 15 questions). The total number of points awarded to the political rights and 
civil liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil liberties ratings from 1 
through 7. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an 
overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free” (Table 2.3). Those whose ratings average 
1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.   
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Table 2.3 
Freedom House Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) Scoring Criteria 
Combined Average of the PR and CL Rating Country Status 
1.0 to 2.5 Free 
3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free 
5.5 to 7.0 Not Free 
   Source: Freedom House (2011). 
 
Table 2.4 
Freedom House Political Rights Scores for Low and Low Middle-income Countries 
Total Scores 
Political Rights 
Rating 
% Low-Income 
Countries 2011 
% Low Middle-Income 
Countries 2011 
 36-40 1 2 12 
 30-35 2 11 21 
 24-29 3 19 21 
 18-23 4 17 6 
 12-17 5 15 6 
 6-11 6 19 21 
 0-5  7 17 12 
 Source: Freedom House (2011). 
 
Table 2.5 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Scores for Low and Low Middle-income Countries 
Total Scores 
Civil Liberties 
Rating 
% Low-Income 
Countries 2011 
% Low Middle-Income 
Countries 2011 
53-60 1 1 12 
44-52 2 7 12 
35-43 3 24 27 
26-34 4 21 21 
17-25 5 23 18 
8-16 6 15 9 
0-7 7 9 0 
Source: Freedom House (2011). 
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For each category, the Freedom House gives these following explanations about the 
ratings: 
2.      Political Rights  
 Political rights ratings are presented in Table 2.4. Countries and territories that receive a 
rating of 1 for political rights come closest to ensuring the freedoms embodied in the checklist 
questions, beginning with free and fair elections. Two % of low-income countries earned this 
rating in 2011. A rating of 2 means that factors as political corruption, violence, political 
discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present 
and weaken the quality of freedom. Eleven % of low-income countries earned this rating in 
2011. Ratings of 3, 4, 5 imply that states and territories in these categories may still enjoy 
some elements of political rights, including the freedom to organize quasi-political groups, 
reasonably free referenda, or other significant means of popular influence on government. 
Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military juntas, 
one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. Nineteen % of low-income 
countries earned this rating in 2011. Finally, for countries and territories with a rating of 7, 
political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent as a result of the extremely oppressive 
nature of the regime or severe oppression in combination with civil war. Seventeen % of low-
income countries earned this rating in 2011. 
3.       Civil Liberties  
Civil liberties rankings are presented in Table 2.5. Countries and territories that receive a 
rating of 1for civil liberties enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of 
opportunity. One % of low-income countries earned this rating in 2011. A Rating of 2 means 
that states and territories  have deficiencies in a few aspects of civil liberties, but are still 
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relatively free. Seven % of low-income countries earned this rating in 2011. Ratings of 3, 4, 5 
imply the level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, including in the areas 
of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. Countries and territories 
with civil liberties rated may be characterized by a few partial rights, such as some religious 
and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free 
private discussion. Fifteen % of low-income countries have this rating in 2011. Finally, 
countries and territories with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. For instance, in 2011, 
seven low-income countries designated as the worst of the worst: Burma, Eritrea, North 
Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; all seven received Freedom in the 
World’s lowest ratings: 7 for political rights and 7 for civil liberties (Freedom House, 2011b). 
Figure 2.9 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Political Rigths (1996-2011) 
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                Source: Freedom House (2011). 
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Figure 2.10 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Civil Liberties (1996-2011) 
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             Source: Freedom House (2011). 
Both figures 2.9 and 2.10 show that the Republic of Niger made progress from 1998 to 
2008. Based on these scores for both political rights and civil liberties, the Republic of Niger 
could be considered as partly free, according to Freedom House’s interpretation of scores 
from 1998 to 2011. 
For both categories Civil Liberties and Political Rights, the MCC adjusts the years on 
the x-axis of the MCA Country Scorecards to correspond to the period of time covered by the 
Freedom in the World publication. For instance, Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) Political Rights 
data come from Freedom in the World 2010 and are labeled as 2009 data on the scorecard. 
H. World Health Organization (WHO) 
1.  Immunization Rate 
The MCC considers the national Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT3) vaccination rate 
and the measles (MCV) vaccination rate estimated by the WHO and UNICEF. Diphtheria-
Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT3) vaccination: is “The percentage of one-year-olds who have received 
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three doses of the combined diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis vaccine in a given year 
(WHO, 2011). WHO considers the Diphtheria Tetanus toxoid and Pertussis (DTP3) 
immunization coverage among 1 year olds. The estimate of immunization coverage is derived 
by dividing the total number of vaccinations given by the number of children in the target 
population, often based on census projections; and the indicator is estimated as the percentage 
of children ages 12–23 months who received three doses of the combined diphtheria, tetanus 
toxoid and pertussis vaccine time before the survey (WHO, 2011).17 
Figure 2.11 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Diphtheria Tetanus Toxoid and Pertussis (DTP3) 
Immunization Coverage Among 1-Year-olds (1996-2009) 
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Source: WHO (2011). 
Figure 2.11 shows that the Republic of Niger is making significant progress 
concerning the Diphtheria Tetanus toxoid and Pertussis (DTP3) immunization coverage 
among 1year olds since 1996 (around 47% increase between 1996 and 2009). 
                                                 
17
 For detailed information please read: 
http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=88 
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Measles Vaccination: is defined as “The percentage of children under one year of age 
who have received at least one dose of measles-containing vaccine in a given year” (WHO, 
2011).18 The indicator is calculated as the proportion of children less than 12-23 months of 
age receiving one dose of measles-containing vaccine, and WHO considers Measles (MCV) 
immunization coverage among 1 year olds. The estimate of immunization coverage is derived 
by dividing the total number of vaccinations given by the number of children in the target 
population, often based on census projections (WHO, 2011). For both indicators, the highest 
estimate of coverage is 99%, and there is no coverage greater than 100%; otherwise results 
contained errors (WHO, 2011). One weakness of this method is the choice of rules, the 
decision as to which rule should apply in a given circumstance, and the absence of any 
articulation of uncertainty (WHO, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 For detailed information please read: 
http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=95 
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Figure 2.12 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Measles (MCV) Immunization Coverage Among 1-Year-
olds (1996-2009) 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009
M
CV
 
(%
)
Years
 
            Source: WHO (2011). 
Figure 2.12 shows that the Republic of Niger is making progress concerning the MCV 
coverage among 1 year olds since 1999, an increase of 38% between 1999 and 2009). 
The MCC uses the simple average of the national diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT3) 
vaccination rate and the measles (MCV) vaccination rate. If a country is missing data for 
either DPT3 or Measles, it does not receive an index value (MCC, 2011d). 
2. Health Expenditures 
WHO (2011) estimates health expenditures as “the sum of outlays for health 
maintenance, restoration or enhancement paid for in cash or supplied in kind.” This indicator 
represents general government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government 
expenditure which includes the consolidated outlays of all levels of government: territorial 
authorities (Central/Federal Government, Provincial / Regional / State / District authorities; 
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Municipal/Local governments), social security and extra budgetary funds (WHO, 2011).19 In 
this indicator, WHO considers that resources are tracked for all public entities acting as 
financing agents such as managing health funds and purchasing or paying for health goods 
and services.  
Data are generated from sources that WHO has been collecting for over ten years. The 
main sources are the EUROSTAT database, International Monetary Fund (IMF), government 
financial statistics and international financial statistics; Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) health data; and the United Nations national accounts 
statistics. National sources include National Health Accounts (NHA) reports, National 
Accounts (NA) reports, General Government (GG) accounts, Public Expenditure Reviews 
(PER), government expenditure by purpose reports Classification of the Functions of 
Government (COFOG), institutional reports of public entities involved in health care 
provision or financing, notably social security and other health insurance compulsory 
agencies and Ministry of Finance (MoF) reports (WHO, 2011). Other possible data sources 
include executed budget and financing reports of social security and health insurance 
compulsory schemes, central bank reports, academic studies, reports and data provided by 
central statistical offices and ministries, statistical yearbooks and other periodicals, and on 
official web sites (WHO, 2011). WHO implies that to estimate the indicator, averages are 
weighted by population to obtain global and regional averages for income groups (World 
Bank classification) and for WHO Regions; and missing values are estimated using various 
accounting techniques depending on the data available for each country. 
                                                 
19
 For detailed information please read: 
http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=93 
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Figure 2.13 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of General Government Expenditure on Health As a 
Percentage of Total Government Expenditure (1996-2009) 
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    Source: WHO (2011). 
Figure 2.13 shows that the Republic of Niger did not make a significant progress 
concerning health expenditure between 1996 and 2003. The share of expenditure for health 
started increasing in 2004 and reached its highest point in 2006, this could be related to the 
political stability that the Republic of Niger experienced during this period. The MCC relies 
on the World Health Organization (WHO) for data on public health expenditure. 
I. United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
1. Primary Education Expenditures20 
Primary education expenditures represent the total public expenditure on education 
(current and capital) expressed as a percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI) or Gross 
National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a given financial year 
                                                 
20
 Graph cannot be drawn because there were not data in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2008. 
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(UIS/UNESCO, 2009). This indicator shows the proportion of a country’s wealth generated 
during a given financial year that has been spent by government authorities on education, and 
it is calculated by dividing the total public expenditure on education in a given financial year 
by the GNI of the country for the corresponding year and multiply by 100 (UIS/UNESCO, 
2009). 
    (3)                 %XGNIt = (PXEt/GNIt) *100 
Where : 
%XGNIt   =        Percentage public expenditure on education in financial year t 
PXEt        =         Total Public expenditure on Education in financial year t 
GNIt        =         Gross National Income in financial year t 
The MCC relies on UNESCO Institute of Statistics as its primary source and self-
reported data from national governments as its secondary source; and UNESCO data are 
treated as the preferred source of information (MCC, 2011d). For instance, according to MCC 
(2011d), MCC first determined if a country has a value reported by UNESCO for 2010, 2009, 
2008, or 2007. If so, the most recent data available within those four years were used. If a 
country did not have a value from UNESCO within four years, the MCC uses the most recent 
available data from national sources. If a country has neither UNESCO data nor nationally 
reported data it does not receive a score. 
The MCC requires inclusion of all government expenditures, including sub-national 
expenditures and the consolidated public sector.  Also, as better data become available, 
UNESCO and the MCC make backward revisions to historical data (MCC, 2011d). 
 
 
  
 
55 
 
2. Girls’ Primary Education Completion Rate 
Girls’ primary education completion rate is measured as the gross intake ratio in the 
last grade of primary which is the “total number of new entrants in the last grade of primary 
education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population at the theoretical 
entrance age to the last grade of primary (UIS/UNESCO, 2009). This could be an automatic 
disadvantage for countries where cultural and religious practices discourage girls’ education. 
This indicator is calculated as the total number of female students enrolled in the last grade of 
primary, minus the number of female students repeating the last grade of primary, divided by 
the total female population of the entrance age of the last grade of primary (MCC, 2011d). 
The MCC uses the most recent score year available. However, due to the fact that the ratio can 
exceed 100%, due to over-aged and under-aged children who enter primary school late/early 
and/or repeat grades, the MCC considers the upper-bound estimate of the actual female 
primary completion rate (MCC, 2011d). 
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Figure 2.14 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Gross Intake Ratio to the Last Grade of Primary: Female 
(1999-2010) 
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       Source: UNESCO (2011). 
Figure 2.14 shows a significant progress that the Republic of Niger made since 1999 about 
girls’ education completion rate (around 21% increase). 
It is important to underline that another area of the MCC’s eligibility criteria that has 
been subject of criticism is “investing in people.” This area includes immunization rate, 
public expenditure on health, and public expenditure on primary education, girls’ primary 
education completion rate, and natural resources management. All these indicators require 
upstream investments in order to perform above the median. How can a poor country invest 
in these areas without external sources of funding? When comparing to countries which are 
flooded by foreign aid, a poor country with little external support would be discriminated 
against in this case and in case fall further behind the mean because other countries could 
have money going to them, thus could improve their scores. There appears to be two main 
problems when using these indicators. First, these indicators are not directly linked with 
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economic growth in a given country. In other words, it takes time to see their impacts on 
economic growth. For instance, the increase of funding does not translate into better 
education or quality of education; it will take sometimes decades to fully measure their 
impacts on economic growth (Bellefleur et al 2010). Second, the data collected are somehow 
ambiguous or with errors since the MCC uses data form WHO which in turn uses many 
sources to collect data. The “urban bias” could be mistaken by sources due to the fact that a 
government spends a lot on health services does not mean that everyone benefits from them.  
Even though there are critics against some of the MCC’s indicators, some 
abovementioned studies have made suggestions in order to improve the selection process. 
Bellefleur et al (2010), suggest that there would be flaws in “investing in people” due to the 
difficulties of using an input indicator, the MCC could take output indicators and 
supplemental data such as Body Mass Index and child mortality into consideration. Bellefleur 
et al (2010) also suggest to the MCC to consider equitable distribution of services across the 
population, and fit the concept of “investing in people” with poverty reduction and sustainable 
economic growth. 
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Table 2.6 
MCC vs. Bellefleur et al (2010) Investing in People Indicators 
MCC’s Investing in People 
indicators (2010) 
Bellefleur et al 2010 (suggestions) 
1. Public Expenditure on Health 1. Immunization Rates 
2. Public Expenditure on Primary 
Education 
2. Public Expenditure on Health, 
supplemented by output indicators and 
other information when possible 
3. Immunization Rates (DPT3 and 
Measles) 
3. Body Mass Index* 
4. Girls’ Primary Education 
Completion 
4. Child Mortality 
5. Natural Resource Management 5. Investment in Education 
  a. Public Expenditure on Primary 
Education 
      i. Educational Quality Indicator(s): e.g., 
grade repetition rates, percentage of 
trained teachers, etc. 
   b. Girls’ Education 
       i. Girls’ Primary Education Completion 
Rate 
      ii. Girls’ Secondary Education 
Enrollment 
 6. Natural Resource Management 
    a. Eco-Region Protection 
    b. Access to Improved Water 
    c. Access to Improved Sanitation 
 7. Investment in Infrastructure 
     a. Public Expenditure on Roads 
      b. Nighttime Lights 
Source: Bellefleur et al (2010). 
* Denotes Body Mass Index and Investment in Infrastructure performed well in terms of data 
quality and their abilities to serve as proxies for a government’s commitment to investing in 
people (Bellefleur et al, 2010). 
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J. Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and the Yale 
Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP) 
1. Natural Resource Management  
The Natural Resource Management indicator has been identified due to a proposal 
submitted to MCC in May 2005 by the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University, and which included the Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy (YCLEP), the University of New Hampshire Water Systems 
Analysis Group, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and the Columbia University Tropical 
Agriculture Program, trough a consortium. It includes four indicators (MCC, 2011d): 1) Eco-
Region Protection: Developed by CIESIN, this indicator assesses whether a country is 
protecting at least 10% of all of its biomes (e.g. deserts, forests, grasslands, aquatic, and 
tundra). According to CIESIN, they treat protected status as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for an ecological region to be “effectively conserved.” The data comes from World 
Wildlife Fund and the United Nations Environment Program World Conservation Monitoring 
Center; 2) Access to Improved Sanitation: Produced by the WHO and the UNICEF, this 
indicator measures the percentage of the population with access to facilities that hygienically 
separate human excreta from human, animal, and insect contact; 3) Access to Improved 
Water: Produced by the WHO and the UNICEF, this indicator measures the percentage of the 
population with access to at least 20 liters of water per person per day from an “improved” 
source (household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected 
springs, and rainwater collection) within one kilometer of the user's dwelling; 4) Child 
Mortality (Ages 1-4): Produced by the Population Division of the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs. They stated that the causes of child mortality among 1–4 year 
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olds are mainly influenced by environmental causes. Since 2009, the indicator was changed to 
the probability of dying between age 1 and 5 instead of the number of deaths per 1000 
children aged 1 to 4.   
2. CIESIN and YCLEP methodology 
  For Access to Adequate Sanitation and Access to Improved Water, the proximity-to-
target measure is equal to the reported percentage.  For example, if a country has 84% of its 
population with access to adequate sanitation, it is considered to have a proximity-to-target 
score of 84.  For child mortality, CIESIN and YCLEP compute the ratio of the measured 
probability of dying to the highest observed probability of dying, which is 0.141, and multiply 
that by 100 to make it comparable to the 0-100 scale used in the other measures. The 
proximity-to-target measure is this number, which ranges from 0-100, subtracted from 100. 
For example, a country whose children in the 1-5 age groups have a probability of dying of 
0.004 would have a proximity-to-target score of 97.2 (0.004/0.1414=0.028; 0.028 x100=2.8; 
100-2.8=97.2). For eco-region protection the proximity-to-target score is 10 times the 
weighted average of the biome protection scores, which are capped at 10% to correspond to 
the target.  For example, a country with an eco-region protection score of 7 would have a 
proximity-to-target score of 70.  The 10% target was established by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in decision VII/30 as target 1.1 of the 2010 Targets, "At least 10% 
of each of the world's ecological regions effectively conserved."  
The MCC simply averages the four, equally weighted indicators (25%). 
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K. International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
1. Business Start-up  
International Finance Cooperation (IFC) calculates the business start-up indicator as 
the average of two indicators: 1) Days to start a business: This component measures the 
number of calendar days it takes to comply with all procedures that are officially required for 
an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. These 
include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and completing any required 
notifications, verifications or inscriptions for the company and employees with relevant 
authorities; 2) Cost of starting a business: This component measures the cost of starting a 
business as a percentage of country’s per capita income. The IFC records all procedures that 
are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or 
commercial business. These include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and 
completing any required notifications, verifications or inscriptions for the company and 
employees with relevant authorities. 
The MCC normalizes the indicators to create a common scale for each of the. Each 
indicator is transformed using a simple formula: 
 (4)  Normalized score = Maximum observed value – Country X’s raw score 
                  Maximum observed value – Minimum observed value 
For instance, to calculate the Republic of Niger’s normalized score on the Days to start 
a business indicator, the MCC first subtracts the Republic of Niger’s raw score (17) 
(minimum observed value) from the maximum observed value (694).21 They then divide the 
difference between those two numbers (677) by the difference between the maximum 
                                                 
21
 The minimum and maximum observed values are the minimum and maximum of all 183 
countries covered by the Doing Business report 2011 (MCC, 2011). 
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observed value (694) and the minimum observed value (1), which determines a normalized 
“days to start a business” score of 0.9769.  
After both of the two subcomponents were transformed into a common scale, MCC calculates 
the Business Start-Up Index using the following formula: 
 (5)    Business Start-Up = .5(IFC Days to Start a Business) + .5(IFC Cost of Starting a 
Business) 
In the Republic of Niger’s case, its normalized Days to Start a Business score (0.9769) is 
given a 50% weight and its Cost of Starting a Business score (0.8391) is given a 50% weight. 
This leads to a Business Start-Up index value of 0.908 (0.5(0.9769) + 0.5(0.8391) = 0.908).  
When it is easy and cheap to do business in a given country, there is an incentive for 
businesses to invest in the country which lead to reduce the unemployment rate, thus 
contribute to the country’s economy. In addition, more jobs in a formal economy will mean 
that more workers are protected by pensions, safety regulations and health benefits (World 
Bank/IFC, 2006). 
2 Land Rights and Access  
The land rights and access indicator is an aggregation of International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD)’s Access to Land (50% weight) and the International 
Finance Corporation IFC’s Days to Register a Property (25% weight) and Cost of Registering 
a Property (25% weight). The IFAD Access to Land indicator is formed from an equally 
weighted average of five subcomponents (Radelet, Rose and Herrling, 2006): 1) The extent to 
which the law guarantees secure land tenure for the poor. IFAD defines poverty as the 
situation of households with persons having the lowest incomes per person, usually one half to 
two thirds of GDP per person; 2) The extent to which the law guarantees secure land tenure 
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for women, indigenous peoples, and other vulnerable groups; 3) The extent to which land is 
titled and registered; 4) The status and functionality of formal land markets; and 5) The extent 
to which the law provides regulation for the allocation and management of communal lands.  
The Land Rights and Access indicator gives a 10% weight to each of the five IFAD 
sub-components and 25% weight to each of the two IFC indicators, the number of days and 
the costs to register land (Radelet, Rose and Herrling, 2006).The IFC indicators provide a 
complement to the IFAD indicators; however, the IFAD indicator is strong on measures of 
equity while the IFC data adds measures of efficiency (Radelet, Rose and Herrling 2006). 
According to the MCC (2011d), countries that received a “no practice” score on the 
IFC’s time to register property indicator were assigned the maximum observed value (i.e. the 
worst possible score) plus one additional day. Also, countries that received a “no practice” 
score on the Cost of Registering Property indicator were assigned the maximum observed 
value (i.e. the worst possible score) plus one additional percentage point of the property value. 
For instance, in FY2011, Liberia had the worst score (0.362). When an economy has no laws 
or regulations covering a specific area, for example bankruptcy, it receives a ‘no practice’ 
mark; similarly, if regulation exists but is never used in practice, or if a competing regulation 
prohibits such practice, the economy receives a ‘no practice’ mark (MCC, 2011d). 
The MCC creates a common scale for each of the indicators by normalizing them 
based on this following formula: 
 (6)  Normalized score = Maximum observed value – Country X’s raw score 
                  Maximum observed value – Minimum observed value 
For instance, to calculate Niger’s normalized score on the IFC Days to Register 
Property indicator, MCC first subtracts the maximum observed value (513) from the Republic 
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of Niger’s raw score (35).22 They then divide the difference between those two numbers (478) 
by the difference between the maximum observed value (513) and the minimum observed 
value (2). This determines a normalized “days to register property” score of 0.9354. After 
each of the three sub-components was transformed into a common scale, MCC calculates the 
Land Rights and Access Index using the following formula: 
   (7)   Land Rights and Access = .5(IFAD) + .25(IFC Time to Register Property) + .25(IFC 
Cost of Registering Property) 
In the Republic of Niger’s case, its normalized IFAD score (0.2754) is given a 50% 
weight, its IFC Time to Register Property score is given a 25% weight (0.9354), and its IFC 
Cost of Registering Property score (0.6174) is given a 25% weight. This gives a Land Rights 
and Access index value of 0.5260 (05(0.2754) + 0.25(0.9354) + 0.25(0.6174) = 0.5260).23 
L. World Economic Outlook (WEO)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
1. Inflation 
WEO inflation data reflect annual percentage change averages for the year, not end-of-
period data (MCC, 2011d). A country needs to have an inflation rate of less than 15%  to pass 
this indicator (MCC, 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The minimum observed values is the minimum of all 183 countries covered by the Doing 
Business report 201 (MCC, 2011). 
23Since high scores on the IFC indicators represent low levels of performance and high scores on 
the IFAD indicator represents high levels of performance, MCC chooses to invert either the 
IFAD normalized scale or the IFC normalized scales. MCC just subtracts each country’s 
normalized value from 1. As such, Niger’s original normalized IFAD score was 0.7246 and its 
inverted normalized IFAD score was 0.2754 (1-0.7246) (MCC, 2011). 
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2. Fiscal Policy 
The MCC (2011d) states that the fiscal policy indicator measures general government net 
lending/borrowing as a percent of GDP, averaged over a three year period. Net lending / 
borrowing are calculated as revenue minus total expenditure (MCC, 2011d). 
M.     Heritage Foundation 
1. Trade policy 
Trade policy indicator is based on Trade Freedom score which is one of the Heritage 
Foundation’ annual Index of Economic Freedom. “In an economically free society, individuals 
would be free and entitled to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they choose 
under a rule of law, with their freedom at once both protected and respected by the state” 
(Heritage Foundation, 2011). Heritage Foundation defines Trade Freedom as “an economy’s 
openness to the import of goods and services from around the world and the citizen’s ability 
to interact freely as buyer or seller in the international marketplace”. The indicator scale 
ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the highest level of protectionism and 100 represents 
the lowest level of protectionism (Heritage Foundation, 2011). Heritage Foundation uses two 
inputs to score the Trade Freedom; the trade weighted average tariff rate and the non-tariff 
barriers.  
The calculation of the scores is based on their following equation: 
(8)     Trade Freedomi = (((Tariffmax–Tariffi )/(Tariffmax–Tariffmin )) * 100) – NTBi 
where Trade Freedomi represents the trade freedom in country i, Tariffmax and Tariffmin 
represent the upper and lower bounds for tariff rates (%), and Tariffi represents the weighted 
average tariff rate (%) in country i. The minimum tariff is naturally zero percent, and the 
upper bound was set as 50 percent. An NTB penalty is then subtracted from the base score. 
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There are five penalties used by Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation, 2011): 
First,  20 (penalties) - NTBs are used extensively across many goods and services and/or act 
to effectively impede a significant amount of international trade. Second, 15 (penalties) - 
NTBs are widespread across many goods and services and/or act to impede a majority of 
potential international trade. Third, 10 (penalties) - NTBs are used to protect certain goods 
and services and impede some international trade. Fourth, 5 (penalties) - NTBs are 
uncommon, protecting few goods and services, and/or have very limited impact on 
international trade. Finally, 0 (penalty) - NTBs are not used to limit international trade. 
Besides these penalties, Heritage foundation considers other factors: First of all, the 
Index uses the most recently reported weighted average tariff rate for a country; however, if 
another reliable source reports more updated information on the country’s tariff rate, the 
grading of this component could be reviewed. Second, the Index uses the country’s average 
applied tariff rate when the weighted average applied tariff rate is not available; and when the 
country’s average applied tariff rate is not available, the weighted average or the simple 
average of Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates is used. Finally, data on tariffs and NTBs 
are obtained from different sources: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and 
Data on Trade and Import Barriers: Trends in Average Tariff Rates for Developing and 
Industrial Countries; the World Trade Organization’s Trade Policy Reviews; the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative’s National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, the 
World Bank’s Doing Business report, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Country 
Commercial Guide, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Reports, Country Profiles, and 
Country Commerce data, and “official government publications of each country” (Heritage 
Foundation, 2011). 
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Figure 2.15 
The Republic of Niger’s Scores of Trade Policy Scale (1996-2011) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2011). 
Figure 2.15 shows that the level of protectionism in the Republic of Niger trends to be 
low since 2000. In other words, the Republic of Niger is opened to international market, given 
the definition of trade freedom by Heritage Foundation. Niger was member of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and later on member of Union 
Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA) in 1994.  
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III.      DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Sources 
As previously defined in the literature review, the MCC uses indicators from ten different 
sources (see Figures 2.1 to 2.3). This study collected data from the above-mentioned sources 
used in computing the MCC index. The data collected are from 2009 for the purpose of this 
study. Table 7.2 gives an example of WGI’s indicators from 2009 with a standard error 
associated with a mean score. Given the fact that the mean of an indicator score from the WGI 
is the average of multiple on the ground surveys, a standard error is also published by the 
WGI. This is important to this study because if the standard error is low then the experts’ 
perceptions seem to be similar. If the standard error is large (relative to the mean) then there 
would appear to be disagreement among the experts on the ground about how a country faired 
on a certain indicator. It is also important to note that even if the standard error is small the 
distribution around the mean may be large enough to result in some observations where a 
country is above the median for its World Bank income grouping and some observations it is 
below the median. This is of the upmost importance since the MCC makes funding decisions 
based on a countries relative standing to its income group's median. Table 7.3 shows an 
example of indicator scores in 2009 from three different sources: 1) World Bank: per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (per capita GNI) data permits the model to classify countries in the 
manner MCC does for funding decisions (low and low-middle income countries); 2) Freedom 
House: Civil Liberties and Political Rights data help to illustrate the level of freedom in a 
given country. These indicators range from 1 to 7; with 1 being the most desirable and 7 being 
the least desirable. Freedom House then breaks that 1 to 7 rating into three distinct groups: 
Free, Partly Free and Not Free; 3) UNESCO provides the Primary Education indicator which 
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shows the proportion of a country’s wealth generated during a given financial year that has 
been spent by government authorities on primary education (UNESCO, 2009). Girls’ primary 
education indicator implies “total number of new entrants in the last grade of primary 
education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population at the theoretical 
entrance age to the last grade of primary" (UIS/UNESCO, 2009). Table 7.4 depicts an 
example of Child Mortality, Improved Sanitation, Improved Water, and Ecoregion Protection 
scores from CIESIN and YCLEP in 2009. Child Mortality is the probability of dying between 
age 1 and 5 (MCC, 2011d). Improved Sanitation measures the percentage of the population 
with access to facilities that hygienically separate human excreta from human, animal, and 
insect contact (MCC, 2011d). Improved Water measures the percentage of the population with 
access to at least 20 liters of water per person per day from an “improved” source (household 
connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and 
rainwater collection) within one kilometer of the user's dwelling (MCC, 2011d). Ecoregion 
Protection assesses whether a country is protecting at least 10% of all of its biomes (e.g. 
deserts, forests, grasslands, aquatic, and tundra), (MCC, 2011d). Table 7.5 illustrates MCV, 
DPT3, Health Expenditures scores from WHO, and Fiscal Policy and Inflation scores from 
WEO/IMF in 2009. According to WHO (2011), MCV and DPT3 indicators represent 
respectively the proportion of children less than 12-23 months of age receiving one dose of 
measles-containing vaccine and the percentage of children ages 12–23 months who received 
three doses of the combined diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis vaccine. For both 
indicators, the highest estimate of coverage is 99%, and there is no coverage greater than 
100% (WHO, 2011). The Health Expenditures indicator represents general government 
expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure. A high Inflation rate is 
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not a good sign for the economy is a given country; so the MCC requires a country to be 
under 15% of inflation to pass this indicator. The fiscal policy indicator measures general 
government net lending/borrowing as a percent of GDP (MCC, 2011d). Table 7.6 depicts 
Days and Cost of Starting Business scores from IFC, Days and Cost of Registering Property 
scores from IFC/IFAD, and Trade Policy scores from Heritage Foundation. The scores from 
IFC and IFAD are clearly explained in section II. The Trade policy scale ranges from 0 to 
100, where 0 represents the highest level of protectionism and 100 represents the lowest level 
of protectionism (Heritage Foundation, 2011). 
B. Methodology 
The MCC has chosen to weigh indicators differently in that if you pass a specific 
percentage (say 60%) of one indictor it does not consider if or how bad you fail the other 40% 
of the indicators and does not make a difference in a funding decision, thus only a set 
percentage of any given category is considered to be pertinent.  The MCC also weights the 
control of corruption indicator the most, in that it's a hard hurdle, which was explained in the 
literature review to be a highly subjective indicator. Thus if a country fails to be above the 
median for its income group for control of corruption it is denied funding regardless of how 
many other indicators it passes. The MCC (2011a) states that to be considered eligible for 
funding, a country should perform above the median in relation to its peers (income group) on 
at least half of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and Encouraging Economic Freedom 
(3/6), above the median on at least three of the five indicators in the Investing in People 
category, and above the median on the control of corruption indicator as defined in the 
literature review. The MCC (2011a) also adds that there is no median for inflation rates, but 
countries need to be under a fixed ceiling of 15% annually.  
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Given the subjectivity in some of the indicators (multiple on the ground scores which 
can possess a large variance) and the fact that the mean score for five indicators is built from 
an average of several expert opinions, and thus a distribution of scores exists, this study 
replicates and re-estimates the MCC methodology using three techniques:  
1. Model I: Replication of MCC Funding Procedure 
First, countries were classified by their World Bank income groupings (low and low-
middle income countries (Table 3.1). Since each country is compared against the median 
scores of their World Bank income classifications the first model groups all low and middle 
income countries (the former with per capita incomes below or equal $1,905 USD and the 
latter between $1,905 USD and $3,945 2011 USD) together so that median scores for each 
indicator for each classification could be estimated. From this, Model I then estimates the 
median score for each income classification and then compares the said median to each 
individual country score. Since the MCC only compares the mean score of a country to the 
median of all scores in an income group the first step in Model I is to compare the mean score 
of each indicator for each country and analyze if it is larger than the median score for a 
countries income classification. Table 3.1  illustrates this procedure. Suppose there are two 
countries, W. Timor and Dutchland. As they are classified in different income groups (LIC 
and LIMC) their indicator scores (A and X, respectively) will be compared to the median 
scores of their respective income groups. Thus, in W. Timor's case if their Civil Liberties 
score, A, is greater than the median of all LMIC's then they will pass (“YES”) that indicator 
(just as the MCC calculates). If Dutchland's Civil Liberties score, X, is less than the median of 
all LIC's Civil Liberties scores then they would fail (“NO”) that indicator. Note, there is no 
comparison between X and A since W. Timor and Dutchland are in different World Bank 
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income groupings. That is if A is greater than X and X passes that does not imply A will pass 
since the median of comparison is different. Table 3.2 takes the individual example from 
above and shows how the Model I calculates the number of "passes" and "failures" a country 
has across indices. In this example W. Timor passes all (100%) of the indices that make up 
this fictional indicator while Dutchland only passes 33%. Since the MCC sets the number of 
passes that a country must have to pass an index the model can set a "threshold" passage rate 
for funding.   While Dutchland and W. Timor's individual indicator scores cannot be 
compared because of the median difference between LIC and LMIC's, the percentage passed 
can be compared and is used to by the MCC. That is, since the threshold passage rate set by 
the MCC for Ruling Justly is three out of six for both LIC and LMIC's then the passage rate 
on Table 3.2 would have to be greater than 66.6% (which in this case it is for W. Timor but 
not for Dutchland). By doing this procedure for all 24 variables the Model I can replicate 
MCC funding decisions based on actual empirical data for 2009.  
 
Table 3.1 
Example of World Bank Country Income Classification and Data Collection for Various 
Indices 
Country  World Bank 
classification 
Civil 
Liberties          Rule of Law  Control of Corruption 
    score mean SE* N.** mean SE* N.** 
Dutchland LIC X X Y Z X Y Z 
W. Timor LMIC A A B C A B C 
      * Denotes Standard Error 
      ** Denotes Number of observations 
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Table 3.2 
Example of Threshold Passage Rates for Model I 
  Classification Civil Liberties 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Number 
passer 
% of 
times 
passed 
Dutchland LIC NO YES NO 1 33.33% 
W. Timor LMIC YES YES YES 3 100% 
 
2. Model II: Simulating Indicators  
 Since all of the WGI’s indicators (Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Control of 
Corruption, Voice & Accountability, and Regulatory Quality) are based on a number of on the 
ground experts’ opinions, the mean value MCC uses is the mean of all scores but a standard 
error is also provided. Model II uses these standard errors to simulate random pulls from the 
distribution of scores from which the ground experts provide. Again, this is important because 
a country may be marginally below the median because of one outlier (in this example a very 
low score) in a series of multiple observations. Using the Excel add on @Risk Model II 
simulated 1000 iterations of an indicator score based on the aforementioned distribution and 
calculated the number of times each country would be above the median for its income 
grouping.  
 Based on their mean scores and standard errors provided in Table 3.1, Model II 
simulates the number of times that each country would pass (be above the median for an 
income group) each indicator. It should be noted that the median of each income group 
changes based on each random draw from every country. That is, the median score is a 
function of the random draws from every country and each draw from a country is compared 
to the new median score. In many cases the standard error is large enough where some experts 
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scores would indicate that a country passed while other experts scores for the same country 
would result in that country failing. Table 3.3 indicates that based on the fictional range of 
experts scores that Dutchland passes (above the median for an LMIC) the Rule of Law 
indicator 87% of the time. Thus one could assume that in Dutchland the experts’ opinions are 
fairly consistent. However; W. Timor passes the same indicator 48% of the time which would 
mean that the experts seem to be divided on Rule of Law in W. Timor. Since, W. Timor failed 
more than it passed in this example (albeit by the slightest margin) the model considers them 
to fail the MCC criteria. The MCC stipulates the number of indicators you have to pass in 
order to pass an index. The MCC states that a country must pass at least half of the indicators 
in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and Encouraging Economic Freedom (3/6), above the median on at 
least three of the five indicators in the Investing in People category (3/5). Therefore the model 
can simulate, based on actual scores and associated standard errors, the percentage of times a 
country would pass that threshold. That is, if a threshold of a general indicator (made up of 
multiple indices) was to pass at least four out of six indices the model could provide the 
number of times that threshold was met given all of the scores provided for each index. Again, 
this is important because if there is one really low or really high score the mean value (which 
the MCC uses) may be misleading. Table 3.3 shows this hypothetically where W. Timor 
passes the threshold (in this case 3 out of six indicators) 75% of the time where Dutchland 
only passes 5% of the time. This is a solid contribution to the MCC methodology in that it 
shows the robustness of the indicator. The closer to 0 and 100% the more robust an indicator 
is the closer to 50% the less robust an indicator becomes. This process is conducted for each 
index where a standard error is provided. From this Model II can show which countries seem 
to have "stable" indictors and which countries may need more data or observations to lower 
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the standard error. Since the MCC simply uses a "pass" or "fail" score, based on being above 
the median, for each indicator a simulated passage rate of 48 and 51% of the time is vastly 
different than a simulated passage rate of 83 and 86% of the time even though the absolute 
difference is the same.  
Table 3.3 
Model II Example of Simulating Passage Rates for Ruling Justly 
  
  
Actual 
data Simulated Passage Rate* 
Number needed to 
pass Ruling Justly = 3 
Country Classification CL PR Risk VA 
Risk 
GE 
Risk 
RL 
Risk 
CC 
Indicators 
passed in 
simulation 
% of 
times 
passed 
Dutchland LIC 1 1 0% 1% 48% 15% 2 5% 
W. Timor LMIC 1 0 100% 8% 87% 25% 3 75% 
        *Based on distribution from Table 3.1 
 
3. Model III: Standardized of Mean Score 
Unlike the Model I which attempts to replicate the funding procedure that the MCC 
uses and the Model II which simulates MCC passage rates based off distributions from on the 
ground scores Model III standardizes the mean scores for each indicator so that all scores 
range between 0 and 1. This model is important because by aggregating all scores into one, 
those countries that marginally fail some indicators but are well above the median for others 
are rewarded for the later and not punished as much for the former. Model III uses the same 
indicators as the MCC, and in Model's I and II, but instead of having to pass X out of Y 
indicators a country must score above a single value for each index. That is, Model III 
jettisons the three of six rules for Ruling Justly and sums all the standardized scores for each 
indicator for Ruling Justly into one score and compares that score to the median of either LIC 
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or LIMCs. So, instead of passing three of six indicators for Ruling Justly a country now has 
one score for Ruling Justly and would be the basis of comparison.  
Model III standardizes the mean scores for each indicator so that all scores range 
between 0 and 1. Since the WGI’s indicators scores range from -2.5 to 2.5 and can have 
negative mean scores, 2.5 is added to each of the mean scores of Control of corruption, 
Regulatory Quality, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability, 
to ensure that all are positive, which gives a new range between 0 and 5; then divided the sum 
value by 5 (maximum value) to get the standardized mean scores for each index. For instance, 
the fictional country Dutchland (Table 3.4) which has a mean score of -1.57 in Control of 
Corruption (has a standardized mean score of 0.19 ((-1.57+2.5)/5 = 0.19) (Table 3.11). Table 
3.5 indicates that based on the standardized mean score, Dutchland passes (above the median 
for LIC) the Control of Corruption 19% of the time. Second, concerning the other eighteen 
indicators, the model divides each score by the maximum value relative to the income group 
to get the standardized mean value. For instance, Table 3.6 indicates that W. Timor which has 
a score of 3 in Civil Liberties has a standardized mean value of 0.43 in that indicator if the 
maximum value within the low-middle income group is 7 (3/7 = 0.43). Then Model III sums 
the simulated standardized mean scores for each country in a given broad policy dimension. 
For instance, Table 3.6 indicates that the summation of all simulated standardized mean score 
for Dutchland is 2.69 for Ruling Justly. Note that Table 3.5 depicts just the standardized mean 
score summation while Table 3.6 indicates the simulated standardized mean score summation.  
Finally, Model III sums the standardized median score respectively to the income 
grouping. For instance, Table 3.6 shows that the sum of the standardized median scores for all 
low middle-income countries for Ruling Justly is 2.75 (Median Sum LMIC).  From this new 
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standardized mean Model III then takes the standard errors (which have been adjusted to the 
new scoring process by adding 2.5 to each standard error, then divided the sum value by 5) 
and simulates the number of times a country would be above the median. Again, Model III 
rewards those countries that have very high scores and reduces the punishment for those 
countries who marginally fail an indicator. Intuitively this seems more robust than simply 
assigning a "pass" or "fail" score. Model III estimates if a country would passes an index if the 
sum of its simulated standardized mean scores is greater or equal to the sum of the 
standardized median of its income grouping. The difference between Model III and I and II is 
that Model III takes into account each indicator (even those a country failed). The rationale 
being that a difference between a marginal pass and a marginal fail is just that, marginal. 
However, Model I and II treat that marginal difference as an absolute difference where Model 
III compares it as a marginal difference. Model III appears to be a large improvement over 
what the MCC is currently using (Model I) in the sense it is more holistic. That is, it rewards a 
country who is improving in all facets of development (even marginally) more so than a 
country who is very good at half of the development indicators and who is poor at the other 
half.  
Table 3.4 
Model III Example Ruling Justly 
                                Mean Scores 
Country Classification CL PR VA GE RL CC 
Dutchland LIC 6 5 -1.39 -1.56 -2.04 -1.57 
W. Timor LMIC 3 3 0.16 -0.2 -0.52 -0.4 
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Table 3.5 
Model III Example of Standardized Mean Scores for Ruling Justly  
  Standardized Mean Scores 
Country Classification CL PR VA GE RL CC 
Dutchland LIC 0.86 0.71 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.19 
W. Timor LMIC 0.43 0.43 0.53 0.46 0.4 0.42 
 
Table 3.6 
Model III Example of Simulated Standardized Mean Scores Ruling Justly  
  
              
Median Sum 
LMIC = 2.75 
    
Median Sum  
LIC = 2.52 
  
Standardized 
Mean Score Simulated Passage Rate* % Median = 0.8 
Country Classification CL PR Risk VA 
Risk 
GE 
Risk 
RL 
Risk 
CC 
Simulated Score 
Summation Funded 
Dutchland LIC 0.86 0.71 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.19 2.69 Yes 
W. Timor LMIC 0.43 0.43 0.53 0.46 0.4 0.42 1.81 No 
* Based off distribution from Table 3.1 
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 IV. RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the analyses. The empirical models described in the 
previous chapter were implemented and used to decipher the specific objectives laid out in 
chapter I.  
The first model (Model I) attempted to mimic the MCC funding methodology by 
comparing each country’s score against the median scores of their World Bank income 
classifications. Table 4.1 illustrates those countries who received funding in 2009 from the 
MCC. By definition those countries on Table 4.1 would have passed (been above their World 
Bank income classification median) at least half of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) 
and Encouraging Economic Freedom (3/6), and passed least three of the five indicators in the 
Investing in People category (3/5). Model I analyzes the raw data presented in the previous 
chapter and calculates the median scores for low income and low middle-income countries 
and denotes which countries are eligible for MCC funding using MCC's definition of 
eligibility.  
1.      Model I Results: Eligibility using MCC's Criteria 
To this early 2011 there are 23 countries which have received a compact program and 
23 countries under funded for the threshold programs (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). Based on the 
above-mentioned the MCC’s criteria, Table 4.2 illustrates those countries that pass the three 
broad policy dimensions in 2009 using Model I. These countries were above their World Bank 
income classification for at least half of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and 
Encouraging Economic Freedom (3/6), and passed least three of the five indicators in the 
Investing in People category (3/5). Based on the above-mentioned MCC’s criteria, Table 4.3 
indicates countries that passed MCC’s Model in 2009. Table 4.4 indicates countries that pass 
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Model I but did not receive MCC funding in 2009. Conversely, Table 4.5 shows countries that 
received MCC funding but did not pass Model I. Tarnoff (2011) states that the MCC board 
does not depend on indicator scores alone to determine the selection but apply other criteria 
which the board is not required to divulge. This other criteria seem to come into play for 
Bolivia, Comoros, Tunisia, and Thailand (Table 4.4), in that they seemingly pass the 
necessary conditions (according to Model I) but did not get funded. However, this “multiple 
reasons” seem to be in favor for the Republic of Niger who fails Model I. The Republic of 
Niger passes the Ruling Justly and Encouraging Economic indices, but fails the Investing in 
People index. This could be due to the fact that the Republic of Niger, one of the poorest 
countries in the world cannot afford to invest in such index in order to be above the median of 
three out fives of the Investing in People. How can a poor country like the Republic of Niger 
can invest in health, education, or environment in order to be above the median without 
external financial supports. That was why  in 2008, the Republic of Niger benefited from the 
MCC’s threshold program which is designed to assist the Republic of Niger improve its 
performance on the policy areas measured by the Control of Corruption, Land Rights, 
Business Start-Up and Girls’ Primary School Education indicators used on the MCC’s 
scorecard (MCC, 2011c). Unfortunately, due to political events that were inconsistent with the 
criteria used to determine a country’s eligibility for MCC assistance, the Republic of Niger’s 
threshold program was suspended on December 31, 2009.   
Model I also provides a list those countries which received MCC’s funding but failed 
the control of corruption indicator. This is important given the fact that according to the MCC 
control of corruption is the only hard hurdle, meaning if a country is below its World Bank 
classification median they automatically are rejected for funding. However; Model I indicates 
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that Nicaragua; Armenia; Mongolia; Honduras; Philippines; Kyrgyz Republic; Paraguay; and 
East Timor failed the control of corruption indicator in 2009 but still received MCC funding. 
(Tables 7.7 and 7.8 give the respective date each of these countries received the MCC’s 
funding). Again, these anomalies may be more of political intervention than simply passing or 
failing an indicator. The interesting point however is that although the MCC says that control 
of corruption is a "hard hurdle" there looks to be exceptions to this rule.  
Table 4.6 lists those countries who fail Model I (which attempts to mimic the MCCs 
standards for funding) but receive MCC funding. Morocco for instance failed Model I but 
received MCC funding. Ghana also did not pass Model I but received MCC funding. Given 
these anomalies (countries who passed Model I but did not get funding and those countries 
who got funding but failed Model I) it could appear that the MCC’s funding are both index 
and politically based which begs the question how much of the decision making for funding 
allocations is based on the index and how much is based on political issues between the U.S 
and a recipient country? Given that being in the same income group does not mean having the 
same per capita GNI or the same external funding, the MCC, besides the political stability, 
should take into consideration that the policy performance of a country is also related to its 
own income and external financial support. 
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Table 4.1 
Countries That Received MCC’s Funding                       
Compact programs Threshold programs 
Low-income  Low middle-income  Low-income  Low middle-income  
Benin Armenia Burkina Faso Albania I 
Burkina Faso Cape Verde Guyana Albania II 
Ghana El Salvador Kenya Indonesia 
Lesotho Georgia Liberia Jordan 
Madagascar Honduras Malawi Kyrgyz Republic 
Malawi Jordan Moldova Paraguay I 
Mali Morocco Niger Paraguay II 
Moldova Namibia Rwanda Peru 
Mongolia Philippines 
Sao-Tome and 
Principle Philippines 
Mozambique Tanzania East-Timor 
Nicaragua Uganda Ukraine 
Senegal Zambia 
Tanzania 
Vanuatu 
 Source: MCC (2011a). 
 
Table 4.2 
Countries That Pass Model I in 2009 
Low-income  Low middle-income 
Bolivia  Albania 
Comoros Bhutan 
Cuba Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Gambia Cape Verde 
Guyana Colombia 
Lesotho El Salvador 
Malawi Jordan 
Rwanda Marshall Islands 
Senegal Sri Lanka 
Solomon Islands Suriname 
Tanzania Thailand 
Zambia Tunisia 
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Table 4.3  
Countries That Pass MCC’s Model in 2009 
Low-income Low Middle-income  
Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bolivia Colombia 
Burkina Faso Jordan 
Egypt Macedonia 
Ghana Thailand 
Guyana Tunisia 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Tanzania 
Vietnam 
Zambia   
 
Table 4.4 
Countries That Pass Model I but Fail the MCC’s Funding in 2009 
Low-income  Low middle-income 
Bolivia  Bhutan 
Comoros Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Cuba Colombia 
Gambia Marshall Islands 
Guyana Sri Lanka 
Solomon Islands Suriname 
  Thailand 
  Tunisia 
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Table 4.5 
Countries That Received the MCC’s Funding but Fail Model I in 2009 
Low-income  Low middle-income  
Benin Armenia 
Burkina Faso El Salvador 
Ghana Georgia 
Guyana Honduras 
Kenya Indonesia 
Liberia Jordan 
Madagascar Kyrgyz Republic 
Malawi Morocco 
Mali Namibia 
Moldova Paraguay  
Mongolia Peru 
Mozambique Philippines 
Nicaragua Timor-Leste 
Niger Ukraine 
Sao-Tome and 
Principle 
Senegal 
Uganda 
Vanuatu   
 
2.     Model II Results:  Simulated Passage Rates Given Multiple on the Ground Scores  
Model II, unlike Model I which looks solely at the mean of an indicator score, 
analyzes the distributions of the scores that make up the mean score. That is, if there is one 
really low or really high score the mean value (which the MCC uses) may be misleading 
because the mean score is a function of all of the on the ground reports. By simulating and 
then taking random pulls from the actual distribution for each indicator Model II can assess 
how stable an indicator is. It also indicates the robustness of the indicator, that is the closer to 
0 and 100% (either always failing or always passing) the more robust an indicator is, the 
closer to 50% the less robust an indicator becomes. Model II is beneficial for analyzing how 
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close a country came to passing and can provide said country information on how to increase 
its chances of passing next year. Again many countries may be marginally below the median 
because of one outlier which skews the mean score. Model II attempts to analyze how any 
such outlier affects the probability of passing.  
Table 4.6 depicts the simulated passage rates for each indicator of the Ruling Justly 
index for low-income countries. The first four columns on Table 4.6 are the percentage of 
times that each country passes a specific indicator based on the distribution of scores provided 
for each indicator on each country. For example, Djibouti has multiple scores given for all its 
indicators and as such Model II simulates random pulls from that distribution. Table 4.6 
illustrates that Djibouti passes Voice and Accountability on average only 1% of the time. This 
would indicate that based on the scores provided by on the ground experts and the distribution 
associated with those scores that they would only be above the median for Voice and 
Accountability for Low Income-countries 1% of the time. To pass that indicator, they would 
need to be above the median at least 50% of the time. The Republic of Niger passes the 
Ruling Justly index 100% of the time (it passes all the six indicators under Model II). This 
shows the robustness of the result since all experts seem to agree about the Republic of 
Niger’s score for the Ruling Justly index. Table 4.6 also illustrates that Djibouti passes 
Government Effectiveness 41% of the time. While this is still below 50% and would be 
considered a "fail" it is vastly different than only passing something 1% of the time. Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties are not simulated given the fact they are not given a range of 
scores. Thus the last column on Table 4.6 indicates the number of times that a country would 
pass the necessary three out of the six Ruling Justly indicators. Djibouti fails, only passing 
39% of the time, but gives a signal about the robustness of that failure. That is, according to 
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on the ground scores if random draws were drawn from the actual Djibouti scores they would 
pass the MCC Ruling Justly indicator 39% of the time. Alone this number does not provide 
much light on the robustness it does when compared to the Afghani score on Table 4.6 of 0% 
passage rate. That is, the closer to 50% the indicator the less robust the results, the closer to 
0% and 100% the more confidence in the results.  
Countries like Guinea-Bissau make interesting case studies since they passed the 
Ruling Justly indicator 53% of the time but failed according to the MCC. This is mostly likely 
due to the wide variance and the skewed distribution of the on the ground scores for Voice 
and Accountability, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Control of Corruption. 
Since Guinea-Bissau passes Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Table 4.6) they only would 
need to pass one more indicator to pass the Ruling Justly index. Table 4.6 shows that the 
average passing rate for Guinea- Bissau is low for Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, 
Government Effectiveness, and Control of Corruption; Model II still indicates that on average 
they pass one of those indicators 53% of the time. This would indicate that there are either 
some "very high passing scores" or some "very low failing scores" leading to a skewed 
distribution. Again, this is important information for MCC because they could see this 53% 
passage rate and request more on the ground reports from Guinea-Bissau next year to increase 
the robustness of the indicator.  
Table 4.7 indicates the simulated passage rates for each indicator of the Ruling Justly 
index for low middle-income countries. Table 4.8 shows the simulated passage rates for each 
indicator of the Encouraging Economic Freedom index for low-income countries. The seven 
first columns on Table 4.8 are the results of passing or failing each indicator. The indicators 
(Time of Business, Cost of Business, Trade Policy, Time of Registering, Cost of Registering, 
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Fiscal Policy, and Inflation) are not simulated since they are not given a range of scores. If a 
country passes each of these seven indicators, it gets “1” or “0” otherwise. For instance, 
Cameroon passes Fiscal Policy indicator and fails Trade Policy indicator. The column for the 
Regulatory Quality indicator shows the percent of time that each country passes this indicator 
based on the distribution of scores provided for this indicator on each country. To pass that 
indicator a country needs to be above the median at least 50% of the time. The Republic of 
Niger passes the Regulatory Quality indicator 91% of the time (Table 4.8). Cameroon has 
multiple scores given for the Regulatory Quality indicator and Model II simulates random 
pulls from this distribution. Table 4.8 indicates that Cameroon passes the Regulatory Quality 
indicator on average 50% of the time. This could give valuable information to the MCC in 
that it would appear that the on the ground experts in Cameroon are truly "split" on their 
opinions on Regulatory Quality and more data is needed to make a sound decision. The last 
column on Table 4.8 indicates the number of times that a country would pass the necessary 
four out of the eight Encouraging Economic Freedom indicators. Cameroon passes 50% of the 
time; this gives a signal about the robustness of the indicator as a whole. Again the fact that 
the passage rate is 50% speaks to the fact the indicator is not very robust. Similarly to Table 
4.8, Table 4.9 presents the simulated passage rates for each indicator of the Encouraging 
Economic Freedom index for low middle-income countries.  
Interestingly, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan (Table 4.6), and Honduras, and Indonesia (Table 
4.7), fail the control of corruption indicator (Model I and II) but receive MCC funding. Again, 
while the MCC states that Control of Corruption is a hard hurdle they also state they provide 
themselves some flexibility in funding decisions. 
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Another interesting case study is that of Paraguay. Paraguay failed the Control of 
Corruption indicator 99% of the time and theoretically should have been disqualified for MCC 
funding (Table 4.7). It also failed the Rule of Law and Government effectiveness 100% of the 
time. That being said, Paraguay received funding possibly due to the fact it passed at least half 
of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and all but one of the six Encouraging Economic 
Freedom indicators (Table 4.8). This begs the question "does MCC look at the holistic 
package (number of total indicators passed across categories)" or does it really stick by the 
hurdle of passing "at least half of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and Encouraging 
Economic Freedom (3/6), and passing least three of the five indicators in the Investing in 
People category (3/5)?" That is, as they define it,  a country needs to pass at least nine 
indicators to get funding, but given these three categories a country could possibly pass 14 
indicators and not get funding (all six of the Encouraging Economic Freedom, all six of the 
Ruling justly and only two of the Investing in People). A country can be punished (or in 
Paraguay's case rewarded) for passing at least three of six indicators with no credence to "how 
bad" they failed the other three indicators. That is, if you have a country like Paraguay who 
passed the necessary three of six but failed the Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and 
Control of Corruption 99% of the time is that the same as a country like Ethiopia (Table 4.7) 
who passes Rule of Law 79% of the time, Government Effectiveness 100% of the time 
Control of Corruption 69% of the time but fails Political Rights and Civil Liberties (both do 
not have distributions only pass or fail)? It begs the question of whether a country who scores 
highly on three indicators and fails the other three indicators badly is truly different from a 
country that passes no indicators but marginally fails all of them. This is the question Model 
III attempts to address. 
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Table 4.6  
 
Simulated Passage Rates from Model II for Each Indicator in the Ruling Justly Index for Low-income Countries in 2009 
 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
% of time 
pass**** 
Afghanistan 0% 0% 0% 0%   0** 0 0% 
Bangladesh 99% 88% 26% 17%      1*** 1 100% 
Benin* 100% 92% 99% 83% 1 1 100% 
Bolivia 100% 1% 81% 72% 1 1 100% 
Burkina Faso* 100% 100% 91% 99% 0 1 100% 
Burundi 46% 2% 9% 4% 1 0 8% 
Cambodia 8% 13% 74% 0% 0 0 1% 
Cameroon 1% 10% 64% 23% 0 0 2% 
Central African Rep 2% 0% 0% 45% 0 0 0% 
Chad 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0% 
Comoros 100% 16% 0% 58% 1 1 100% 
Congo, Dem Rep 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0% 
Côte d'Ivoire 0% 0% 2% 2% 0 0 0% 
Cuba 0% 93% 96% 100% 0 0 89% 
Djibouti 1% 93% 41% 99% 0 0 39% 
Eritrea 0% 1% 1% 99% 0 0 0% 
Ethiopia 0% 79% 100% 69% 0 0 55% 
Gambia 1% 100% 87% 89% 0 1 99% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass 
*** Denotes pass 
**** Denotes passing three of six indicators 
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Table 4.6  
 
 Cont’d 
 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right  
Civil 
Liberties 
% of time 
pass**** 
Ghana* 100% 100% 100% 100% 1*** 1 100% 
Guinea 0% 0% 1% 1%     0** 0 0% 
Guinea-Bissau 38% 1% 19% 10%      1 1 53% 
Guyana* 100% 96% 100% 90% 1 1 100% 
Haiti 81% 0% 0% 4% 1 0 5% 
India 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 1 100% 
Iraq 0% 0% 4% 0% 0 0 0% 
Kenya* 100% 8% 88% 2% 1 1 100% 
Kyrgyzstan* 2% 0% 29% 0% 0 1 1% 
Laos 0% 38% 20% 4% 0 0 0% 
Lesotho* 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 1 100% 
Liberia* 100% 9% 5% 92% 1 1 100% 
Madagascar* 77% 86% 92% 100% 1 1 100% 
Malawi* 100% 100% 98% 97% 1 1 100% 
Mali* 100% 100% 73% 76% 1 1 100% 
Mauritania 1% 63% 42% 80% 0 0 22% 
Moldova* 100% 100% 93% 67% 1 1 100% 
Mongolia* 100% 100% 63% 59% 1 1 100% 
Mozambique* 100% 99% 100% 99% 1 1 100% 
Nepal 88% 30% 31% 61% 1 1 97% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass 
*** Denotes pass 
**** Denotes passing three of six indicators 
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Table 4.6  
 
Cont’d 
 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
% of time 
pass**** 
Nicaragua* 97% 66% 17% 60% 1 1 100% 
Niger* 53% 95% 74% 79% 1 1 100% 
Nigeria 10% 1% 1% 5%     0** 1 1% 
Pakistan 1% 41% 35% 3%      1*** 0 17% 
Papua New Guinea 100% 29% 57% 0% 1 1 100% 
Rwanda* 0% 99% 100% 100% 0 0 99% 
Sao Tome & Principe* 100% 84% 79% 96% 1 1 100% 
Senegal* 100% 100% 100% 96% 1 1 100% 
Sierra Leone 100% 27% 4% 17% 1 1 100% 
Solomon Islands 100% 85% 31% 94% 1 1 100% 
Sudan 0% 0% 1% 1% 0 0 0% 
Tajikistan 0% 1% 11% 2% 0 0 0% 
Tanzania* 100% 100% 100% 99% 1 1 100% 
Togo 1% 49% 0% 7% 0 0 0% 
Uganda* 98% 100% 93% 33% 0 1 100% 
Uzbekistan 0% 1% 74% 0% 0 0 0% 
Viet Nam 0% 100% 100% 97% 0 0 97% 
Yemen 0% 4% 9% 11% 0 0 0% 
Zambia* 100% 100% 88% 97% 1 1 100% 
Zimbabwe 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass 
*** Denotes pass     
 **** Denotes passing three of six indicators 
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Table 4.7  
 
Simulated Passage Rates from Model II for Each Indicator the Ruling Justly Index for Low Middle-income  
Countries in 2009 
 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
% of time 
pass**** 
Albania* 100% 31% 80% 69% 1 1 100% 
Algeria 0% 2% 10% 45% 0 0 0% 
Angola 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0% 
Armenia* 0% 65% 99% 20% 0 1 71% 
Azerbaijan 0% 1% 7% 0% 0 0 0% 
Belarus 0% 0% 0% 3%     0** 0 0% 
Bhutan 0% 100% 100% 100%      1*** 0 100% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 94% 67% 8% 88% 1 1 100% 
Cape Verde* 100% 100% 96% 100% 1 1 100% 
China 0% 76% 100% 35% 0 0 27% 
Colombia 64% 53% 99% 89% 1 1 100% 
Dominican Rep 100% 3% 34% 12% 1 1 100% 
Ecuador 45% 0% 1% 1% 1 1 46% 
Egypt 0% 100% 67% 63% 0 0 43% 
El Salvador* 100% 1% 96% 96% 1 1 100% 
Fiji 1% 8% 2% 18% 0 1 2% 
Georgia* 73% 98% 100% 95% 1 1 100% 
Guatemala 26% 0% 3% 22% 1 1 43% 
Honduras* 4% 0% 3% 1% 1 1 7% 
Indonesia* 95% 19% 81% 5% 1 1 100% 
Iran 0% 0% 3% 4% 0 0 0% 
Jamaica 100% 40% 99% 58% 1 1 100% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass      *** Denotes pass    **** Denotes passing three of six indicators 
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Table 4.7 
 
            Cont’d 
 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
% of time 
pass**** 
Jordan* 0% 100% 100% 100%    0** 0 100% 
Kiribati 100% 100% 9% 90%      1*** 1 100% 
Macedonia 100% 94% 88% 100% 1 1 100% 
Maldives 71% 96% 48% 23% 1 1 99% 
Marshall Islands 100% 65% 0% 61% 1 1 100% 
Micronesia 100% 99% 21% 78% 1 1 100% 
Morocco* 0% 98% 94% 93% 0 1 99% 
Namibia* 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 1 100% 
Paraguay* 55% 0% 0% 1% 1 1 56% 
Peru* 99% 7% 53% 77% 1 1 100% 
Philippines* 88% 26% 91% 5% 1 1 99% 
Sri Lanka 2% 100% 86% 75% 1 1 100% 
Suriname 100% 96% 94% 75% 1 1 100% 
Swaziland 0% 12% 5% 83% 0 0 1% 
Syria 0% 46% 9% 0% 0 0 0% 
Thailand 9% 99% 100% 96% 0 1 100% 
Timor-Leste* 99% 0% 0% 1% 1 1 99% 
Tonga 83% 97% 50% 21% 0 1 91% 
Tunisia 0% 100% 100% 100% 0 0 100% 
Turkmenistan 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0% 
Ukraine* 95% 1% 1% 0% 1 1 94% 
Vanuatu* 100% 100% 64% 100% 1 1 100% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass 
*** Denotes pass         **** Denotes passing three of six indicators 
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Table 4.8 
 
Simulated Passage Rates from Model II for Each Indicator the Encouraging Economic Freedom Index for Low-income  
Countries in 2009 
 
Country 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Regulatory 
Quality 
% of time 
pass**** 
Afghanistan     0** 0 0 1 1 1 1 0% 100% 
Bangladesh       1*** 0 0 1 1 1 1 27% 100% 
Benin* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 97% 100% 
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 4% 100% 
Burkina Faso* 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 100% 100% 
Burundi 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1% 100% 
Cambodia 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 97% 100% 
Cameroon 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 50% 100% 
Central African Rep 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1% 100% 
Chad 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1% 100% 
Comoros 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0% 100% 
Congo, Dem Rep 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0% 0% 
Côte d'Ivoire 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 4% 100% 
Cuba 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0% 100% 
Djibouti 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 69% 100% 
Eritrea 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0% 100% 
Ethiopia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3% 0% 
Gambia 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 98% 100% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass 
*** Denotes pass 
**** Denotes passing four of eight indicators 
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Table 4.8 
 
           Cont’d 
 
Country 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Regulatory 
Quality 
% of time 
pass**** 
Ghana*    0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% 0% 
Guinea      1*** 1 0 1 1 0 1 0% 100% 
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1% 100% 
Guyana* 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 66% 100% 
Haiti 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 22% 100% 
India 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 99% 0% 
Iraq 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 22% 100% 
Kenya* 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 100% 100% 
Kyrgyzstan* 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 97% 97% 
Laos 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 2% 100% 
Lesotho* 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 75% 100% 
Liberia* 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0% 0% 
Madagascar* 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 93% 100% 
Malawi* 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 82% 100% 
Mali* 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 95% 100% 
Mauritania 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 57% 0% 
Moldova* 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
Mongolia* 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 99% 0% 
Mozambique* 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 99% 99% 
Nepal 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 29% 29% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pass 
*** Denotes pass 
**** Denotes passing four of eight indicators 
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Table 4.8 
 
             Cont’d 
 
Country 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Regulatory 
Quality 
% of time 
pass**** 
Nicaragua* 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 97% 100% 
Niger*     0** 1 1 0 1 0 1 91% 100% 
Nigeria       1*** 1 0 1 1 0 1 46% 100% 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 87% 0% 
Papua New Guinea 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 83% 100% 
Rwanda* 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 97% 100% 
Sao Tome & Principe* 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 37% 37% 
Senegal* 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 100% 100% 
Sierra Leone 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 33% 100% 
Solomon Islands 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1% 100% 
Sudan 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0% 0% 
Tajikistan 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1% 1% 
Tanzania* 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 97% 97% 
Togo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20% 100% 
Uganda* 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 100% 100% 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0% 0% 
Viet Nam 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 79% 0% 
Yemen 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 69% 69% 
Zambia* 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 92% 92% 
Zimbabwe 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0% 100% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pas 
*** Denotes pass 
**** Denotes passing four of eight indicators 
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Table 4.9 
 
Simulated Passage Rates from Model II for Each Indicator the Encouraging Economic Freedom Index for Low Middle-income  
Countries in 2009  
 
Country 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Regulatory 
Quality 
% of time 
pass**** 
Albania*     0** 1 1 1 0 0 1 100% 100% 
Algeria 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0% 0% 
Angola      1*** 1 0 1 1 0 1 0% 100% 
Armenia* 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
Azerbaijan 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 51% 51% 
Belarus 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0% 100% 
Bhutan 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0% 100% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 90% 100% 
Cape Verde* 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 94% 100% 
China 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 71% 71% 
Colombia 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 100% 100% 
Dominican Rep 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 79% 100% 
Ecuador 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0% 100% 
Egypt 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 82% 0% 
El Salvador* 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 100% 100% 
Fiji 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0% 100% 
Georgia* 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
Guatemala 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 89% 100% 
Honduras* 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 61% 100% 
Indonesia* 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 99% 0% 
Iran 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 52% 100% 
Jamaica 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0% 100% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pas 
*** Denotes pass          **** Denotes passing four of eight indicators 
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Table 4.9 
 
           Cont’d 
 
Country 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Regulatory 
Quality 
% of time 
pass**** 
Jordan*     0**       1*** 1 0 1 0 1 100% 100% 
Kiribati 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0% 0% 
Macedonia 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 100% 100% 
Maldives 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 29% 29% 
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1% 100% 
Micronesia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1% 100% 
Morocco* 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 96% 100% 
Namibia* 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 98% 100% 
Paraguay* 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 98% 100% 
Peru* 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 98% 100% 
Philippines* 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 96% 100% 
Sri Lanka 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 51% 100% 
Suriname 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6% 100% 
Swaziland 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 12% 100% 
Syria 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0% 0% 
Thailand 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 100% 100% 
Timor-Leste* 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0% 100% 
Tonga 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 8% 100% 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 99% 99% 
Turkmenistan 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0% 0% 
Ukraine* 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 6% 6% 
Vanuatu* 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 4% 100% 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
** Denotes did not pas 
*** Denotes pass          **** Denotes passing four of eight indicators
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3.       Model III Results: Standardized of Mean Scores 
Model III standardizes the mean scores for each indicator so that all scores range between 0 and 
1. These standardized scores are summed and compared to the relevant median score of the LICs 
or LIMCs.  By aggregating all scores into one, those countries that marginally fail some 
indicators but are well above the median for others are rewarded for the later and not punished as 
much for the former. Results for the Ruling Justly and the Encouraging Economic Freedom 
indices are presented.  
 Table 4.10 depicts the mean standardized scores from Model III for Ruling Justly for all 
of the low-income countries in 2009. The first six columns on Table 4.10 are the mean 
standardized scores for each indicator for each country. It should be noted that in all instances a 
higher score is better. It should also be noted that while Freedom House scores Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties from 1 to 7 with 1 being the highest score. Because of this all scores for 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties were reversed such that a score of 1 (the best according to 
Freedom House is now a 7, a 2 converted to a 6, etc.). In this manner it is desirable for all of the 
indictors to have a high score and an accurate comparison can be made across indicators. As an 
example, on Table 4.10 Afghanistan's total score for Ruling Justly is 1.40 which is the 
summation of all the indicators (first row in Table 4.10).  Model III estimates if a country would 
pass an index if the sum of its mean standardized scores is greater or equal to the sum median 
standardized score of its income grouping. In Afghanistan's case it's single score for Ruling 
Justly (1.40, Table 4.10) is below the median score for all low-income countries of 2.40 (top of 
Table 4.10), thus they would fail. This model is important since it takes into consideration 
country’s performance across all indicators and doesn't simply count the number it passes. 
Intuitively this seems more robust than simply assigning a "pass" or "fail" score. Table 4.11 
  
 
100 
 
indicates the mean standardized scores for Ruling Justly for low middle-income countries in 
2009. 
Comparing the results of model's II and III makes for interesting case studies. When 
looking at Table 4.7 both Morocco and Paraguay pass the Ruling Justly threshold of three out of 
six indicators with scores of 99 and 56%, respectively. Morocco sources a zero percent on Voice 
and accountability and over 90% on Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Control of 
Corruption. Paraguay on the other hand scores 0% on Rule of Law and Government 
Effectiveness. Under the scoring system in Model's I and III these zero scores are irrelevant 
because both Paraguay and Morocco pass at least three of six indicators easily. However; in 
Model III (Table 4.11) both countries score below the median and would not be funded. The case 
of East-Timor could also be highlighted. East-Timor passes the Ruling Justly index 99% of the 
time in Model II, but under Model III it fails, since East-Timor performs very poorly in Rule of 
Law (0% of the time), Government effectiveness (0% of the time), and the Control of Corruption 
(1% of the time). This is due to the fact that model III looks at all indicators and punishes these 
countries heavily for such low scores (0%).  
 Model III works in the favor in those countries such as Nepal who in Model I and II only 
passes three out of eight indicators 29% of the time and thus would not get funding (Table 4.8). 
However; given the fact that Nepal marginally failed some of the indicators they are rewarded in 
Model III and actually would be funded. Table 4.12 indicates that Nepal earns a score of 0.78 for 
Encouraging Economic Freedom which is higher than the median score of 0.38. In this sense the 
multiple marginal fails for Nepal are scored as relative fails not absolute fails and thus in the 
aggregate they are funded. While Model III worked in favor for countries like Nepal it can work 
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against them just as easily. Because of this it would seem that Model III is a more holistic 
indicator.    
  Table 4.12 shows the mean standardized scores for Encouraging Economic Freedom for 
low-income countries in 2009. It should be noted that some of the values are negative and that 
the total score can be negative. This is due to the fact that with some variables (time of 
registering a business, cost of doing business, inflation, fiscal policy) a higher score is not 
desirable. In these cases instead of adding to a score a variable is subtracted. Thus if it took 1 day 
to start a business you would subtract a number less than a country where it took 100 days to 
start a business. The goal for Model III with Encouraging Economic Freedom is still to obtain a 
high score and the break between positive and negative scores is arbitrary, where the relative 
difference between scores is the only meaningful comparison and not if a score is positive or 
negative. The first eight columns on Table 4.12 are the mean standardized scores for each 
indicator for each country. For instance, the Republic of Niger’s Regulatory Quality score is 
0.41. The last column on Table 4.12 shows the sum of the standardized median scores (total 
score) for each low-income country for the Encouraging Economic Freedom index. For instance, 
the Republic of Niger's total score is 0.41, which is above the  median standardized score for all 
low-income countries is 0.38 indicating they would pass under model III's scoring mechanism. 
Recall that a country would pass an index if the sum of its mean standardized scores is greater or 
equal to the sum median standardized score of its income grouping according to Model III. 
Model III works in favor for countries like Tajikistan who in Model I and II only passes three out 
of eight indicators 1% of the time (Table 4.8). Tajikistan marginally fails some indicators but is 
rewarded in Model III. Table 4.12 indicates that Tajikistan scores of 0.73 for Encouraging 
Economic Freedom which is greater than 0.38, thus passes Model III.  Model III looks at a 
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country holistically in development and simply does not say you need to be doing well in X out 
of Y sectors and if you are every other sector is irrelevant. Table 4.13 shows the mean 
standardized scores for Encouraging Economic Freedom for low middle-income countries in 
2009. Countries like Georgia, who in Model I and II only pass three out of eight indicators 1% of 
the time (Table 4.8), are rewarded in Model III even if they fail some indicators. Again, Model 
III is important since it takes into consideration country’s performance on all indicators.   
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Table 4.10 
 
Mean Standardized Scores from Model III for the Ruling Justly Index for Low-income Countries in 2009 
 
Sum Median Score  = 2.49 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
Total 
Score 
Afghanistan 0.22 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.43 0.29 1.40 
Bangladesh 0.43 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.57 0.57    2.53** 
Benin* 0.56 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.86 0.86    3.41** 
Bolivia 0.48 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.71 0.71    2.88** 
Burkina Faso* 0.45 0.44 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.71    2.82** 
Burundi 0.35 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.57 0.43 2.17 
Cambodia 0.32 0.29 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.43 1.94 
Cameroon 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.29 1.81 
Central African Rep 0.30 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.43 0.43 1.95 
Chad 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.29 1.27 
Comoros 0.44 0.28 0.14 0.35 0.71 0.57    2.50** 
Congo, Dem Rep 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.29 1.31 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.43 1.74 
Cuba 0.16 0.37 0.40 0.56 0.14 0.29 1.92 
Djibouti 0.28 0.37 0.32 0.45 0.43 0.43 2.27 
Eritrea 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.43 0.14 0.29 1.40 
Ethiopia 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.43 0.43 2.23 
Gambia 0.29 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.57 2.46 
         * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
                       ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.10 
Cont’d 
Sum Median Score  = 2.49 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
Total 
Score 
Ghana* 0.60 0.48 0.51 0.51 1.00 0.86     3.96** 
Guinea 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.14 0.43 1.46 
Guinea-Bissau 0.35 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.57 0.57 2.28 
Guyana* 0.52 0.38 0.46 0.39 0.86 0.71     3.32** 
Haiti 0.38 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.57 0.43 2.10 
India 0.59 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.86 0.71     3.61** 
Iraq 0.27 0.13 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.29 1.44 
Kenya* 0.44 0.29 0.37 0.28 0.57 0.71     2.65** 
Kyrgyzstan* 0.31 0.24 0.30 0.26 0.43 0.57 2.11 
Laos 0.16 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.14 0.29 1.46 
Lesotho* 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.86 0.71    3.47** 
Liberia* 0.44 0.28 0.27 0.39 0.71 0.57    2.66** 
Madagascar* 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.45 0.57 0.71    2.84** 
Malawi* 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.57 0.57     2.86** 
Mali* 0.53 0.42 0.35 0.36 0.86 0.71     3.23** 
Mauritania 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.29 0.43 2.03 
Moldova* 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.57 0.57     2.73** 
Mongolia* 0.49 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.86 0.86     3.31** 
Mozambique* 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.71 0.71    3.15** 
Nepal 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.57 0.57    2.49** 
                   * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
                   ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.10 
Cont’d 
Sum Median Score  = 2.49 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
Total 
Score 
Nicaragua* 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.35 0.57 0.71     2.66** 
Niger* 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.71 0.57     2.74** 
Nigeria 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.43 0.57 2.13 
Pakistan 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.57 0.43 2.21 
Papua New Guinea 0.52 0.31 0.33 0.22 0.57 0.71     2.67** 
Rwanda* 0.24 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.29 0.43 2.35 
Sao Tome & Principe* 0.53 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.86 0.86    3.39** 
Senegal* 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.71 0.71    3.12** 
Sierra Leone 0.45 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.71 0.71     2.75** 
Solomon Islands 0.54 0.37 0.30 0.43 0.57 0.71     2.91** 
Sudan 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.14 0.14 1.19 
Tajikistan 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.43 1.76 
Tanzania* 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.57 0.71     3.00** 
Togo 0.29 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.43 0.43 1.98 
Uganda* 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.43 0.57     2.52** 
Uzbekistan 0.11 0.26 0.36 0.25 0.14 0.14 1.26 
Viet Nam 0.20 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.14 0.43 2.03 
Yemen 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.43 0.43 1.94 
Zambia* 0.45 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.71 0.71     3.04** 
Zimbabwe 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.29 1.10 
       * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
                    ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.11 
Mean Standardized Scores from Model III for the Ruling Justly Index for Low Middle-income Countries in 2009 
Sum Median Score  = 2.85 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
Total 
Score 
Albania* 0.53 0.40 0.46 0.42 0.71 0.71    3.24** 
Algeria 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.29 0.43 2.14 
Angola 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.23 0.29 0.43 1.80 
Armenia* 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.38 0.29 0.57 2.51 
Azerbaijan 0.26 0.34 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.43 1.96 
Belarus 0.19 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.14 0.29 1.56 
Bhutan 0.37 0.53 0.58 0.67 0.57 0.43     3.15** 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.49 0.42 0.37 0.44 0.57 0.71     3.01** 
Cape Verde* 0.67 0.59 0.50 0.64 1.00 1.00     4.40** 
China 0.17 0.43 0.52 0.39 0.14 0.29 1.95 
Colombia 0.46 0.41 0.51 0.44 0.71 0.57     3.10** 
Dominican Rep 0.52 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.86 0.86     3.37** 
Ecuador 0.45 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.71 0.71 2.77 
Egypt 0.28 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.29 0.43 2.34 
El Salvador* 0.52 0.34 0.49 0.47 0.86 0.71     3.39** 
Fiji 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.57 2.22 
Georgia* 0.46 0.47 0.54 0.45 0.57 0.57     3.07** 
Guatemala 0.43 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.71 0.57 2.74 
Honduras* 0.41 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.71 0.71 2.84 
Indonesia* 0.49 0.39 0.46 0.36 0.86 0.71     3.27** 
Iran 0.20 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.29 1.78 
Jamaica 0.61 0.40 0.53 0.41 0.86 0.71     3.52** 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
              ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.11 
Cont’d 
Sum Median Score  = 2.85 
Country 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Right 
Civil 
Liberties 
Total 
Score 
Jordan* 0.33 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.43 0.43     2.87** 
Kiribati 0.65 0.54 0.36 0.48 1.00 1.00     4.02** 
Macedonia 0.53 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.71 0.71     3.38** 
Maldives 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.36 0.57 0.57     2.89** 
Marshall Islands 0.72 0.44 0.21 0.43 1.00 1.00     3.80** 
Micronesia 0.71 0.52 0.38 0.48 1.00 1.00     4.09** 
Morocco* 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.57 2.74 
Namibia* 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.86 0.86    3.91** 
Paraguay* 0.45 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.71 0.71 2.82 
Peru* 0.51 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.86 0.71     3.31** 
Philippines* 0.48 0.39 0.47 0.36 0.57 0.71     2.99** 
Sri Lanka 0.40 0.49 0.47 0.43 0.57 0.57     2.92** 
Suriname 0.58 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.86 0.86     3.70** 
Swaziland 0.26 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.14 0.43 2.01 
Syria 0.17 0.41 0.38 0.31 0.14 0.29 1.70 
Thailand 0.42 0.47 0.53 0.45 0.43 0.57     2.88** 
Timor-Leste* 0.52 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.71 0.57 2.63 
Tonga 0.49 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.43 0.71     2.91** 
Tunisia 0.25 0.54 0.58 0.50 0.14 0.43 2.45 
Turkmenistan 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.14 1.05 
Ukraine* 0.49 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.71 0.86     3.08** 
Vanuatu* 0.62 0.58 0.45 0.58 0.86 0.86     3.94** 
         * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
                       ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.12 
Mean Standardized Scores from Model III for the Encouraging Economic Freedom Index for Low-income  
Countries in 2009 
 
  
        Sum Median Score  = 0.38 
Country 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Total 
Score 
Afghanistan 0.14 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.49 -0.25 -0.03 -0.26 -0.96 
Bangladesh 0.34 -0.11 -0.03 0.45 -0.48 -0.37 -0.06 -0.12 -0.36 
Benin* 0.43 -0.04 -0.21 0.76 -0.23 -0.43 -0.06 -0.05 0.17 
Bolivia 0.30 -0.07 -0.12 0.93 -0.18 -0.18 -0.01 -0.07      0.60** 
Burkina Faso* 0.47 -0.02 -0.07 0.80 -0.27 -0.48 -0.09 -0.06 0.29 
Burundi 0.27 -0.05 -0.23 0.71 -0.18 -0.28 -1.00 -0.23 -0.98 
Cambodia 0.43 -0.12 -0.16 0.72 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01      0.51** 
Cameroon 0.36 -0.05 -0.15 0.63 -0.18 -0.69 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 
Central African Rep 0.28 -0.03 -0.25 0.57 -0.15 -0.66 0.00 -0.08 -0.33 
Chad 0.28 -0.11 -0.27 0.66 -0.09 -0.67 -0.17 -0.22 -0.58 
Comoros 0.18 -0.03 -0.20 0.31 -0.05 -0.74 -0.05 -0.10 -0.68 
Congo, Dem Rep 0.18 -0.19 -1.00 0.70 -0.11 -0.33 -0.09 -1.00 -1.83 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.31 -0.06 -0.14 0.80 -0.12 -0.50 -0.03 -0.02 0.23 
Cuba 0.18 0.00 -0.09 0.73 -0.15 -0.26 -0.09 0.00 0.31 
Djibouti 0.38 -0.05 -0.21 0.36 -0.08 -0.47 -0.08 -0.04 -0.19 
Eritrea 0.05 -0.12 -0.11 0.78 -0.15 -0.33 -0.25 -0.71 -0.85 
Ethiopia 0.30 -0.02 -0.03 0.78 -0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.79 0.03 
Gambia 0.44 -0.04 -0.27 0.67 -0.13 -0.27 -0.04 -0.10 0.26 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
              ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.12 
Cont’d 
  Sum Median Score  = 0.38 
Country 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Total 
Score 
Ghana* 0.52 -0.02 -0.03 0.71 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10 -0.42      0.56** 
Guinea 0.26 -0.06 -0.15 0.67 -0.20 -0.50 -0.12 -0.17 -0.26 
Guinea-Bissau 0.26 -0.37 -0.50 0.76 -0.41 -0.19 -0.05 -0.04 -0.54 
Guyana* 0.38 -0.06 -0.07 0.82 -0.07 -0.16 -0.06 -0.06       0.72** 
Haiti 0.33 -0.28 -0.28 0.90 -0.79 -0.23 -0.08 -0.07 -0.50 
India 0.45 -0.03 -0.06 0.88 -0.04 -0.20 -0.08 -0.19      0.74** 
Iraq 0.44 -0.11 -0.08 0.86 -0.08 -0.38 -0.03 -0.10       0.52** 
Kenya* 0.56 -0.01 -0.01 0.80 -0.11 -0.39 -0.19 -0.21       0.45** 
Kyrgyzstan* 0.25 -0.03 -0.07 0.62 -1.00 0.00 -0.22 -0.19 -0.64 
Laos 0.29 -0.14 -0.01 0.75 -0.26 -0.15 -0.11 0.00 0.36 
Lesotho* 0.38 -0.06 -0.04 0.64 -0.20 -0.29 -0.07 -0.13 0.25 
Liberia* 0.26 -0.04 -0.07 0.61 -0.10 -0.48 -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 
Madagascar* 0.56 -0.01 0.00 0.92 -0.13 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04     1.14** 
Malawi* 0.39 -0.06 -0.13 0.78 -0.17 -0.12 -0.09 -0.18     0.42** 
Mali* 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 0.50 -0.15 -0.26 -0.36 -0.09 0.03 
Mauritania 0.30 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.26 -0.09 0.00 -0.25 
Moldova* 0.32 -0.02 -0.15 0.92 -0.15 -0.26 -0.09 0.00     0.56** 
Mongolia* 0.43 -0.02 0.00 0.92 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.14     1.01** 
Mozambique* 0.50 -0.02 -0.02 0.77 -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02     0.90** 
Nepal 0.52 -0.10 -0.02 1.00 -0.04 -0.35 -0.03 -0.19     0.78** 
* Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
              ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.12 
Cont’d 
  Sum Median Score  = 0.38 
Country 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Total 
Score 
Nicaragua* 0.42 -0.06 -0.13 0.90 -0.24 -0.13 -0.03 -0.08      0.65** 
Niger* 0.41 -0.03 -0.18 0.80 -0.07 -0.40 -0.09 -0.02      0.41** 
Nigeria 0.36 -0.04 -0.10 0.70 -0.16 -0.75 -0.17 -0.27 -0.43 
Pakistan 0.40 -0.03 -0.01 0.74 -0.10 -0.26 -0.09 -0.45 0.20 
Papua New Guinea 0.39 -0.07 -0.02 0.99 -0.14 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15      0.65** 
Rwanda* 0.42 -0.05 -0.07 0.95 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06      1.01** 
Sao Tome & Principe* 0.35 -0.21 -0.10 0.68 -0.12 -0.39 -0.29 -0.37 -0.44 
Senegal* 0.45 -0.01 -0.08 0.81 -0.24 -0.74 -0.08 -0.04 0.06 
Sierra Leone 0.35 -0.02 -0.16 0.75 -0.17 -0.61 -0.05 -0.20 -0.12 
Solomon Islands 0.25 -0.08 -0.07 0.75 -0.58 -0.18 -0.03 -0.15 -0.09 
Sudan 0.25 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08 -0.24 -0.31 
Tajikistan 0.28 -0.09 -0.03 0.93 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14      0.73** 
Tanzania* 0.42 -0.04 -0.04 0.86 -0.14 -0.16 -0.08 -0.26      0.56** 
Togo 0.33 -0.08 -0.27 0.80 -0.58 -0.48 -0.05 -0.04 -0.36 
Uganda* 0.47 -0.04 -0.11 0.85 -0.15 -0.15 -0.04 -0.31      0.53** 
Uzbekistan 0.19 -0.02 -0.01 0.74 -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 -0.30  0.33 
Viet Nam 0.39 -0.07 -0.02 0.72 -0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.15      0.56** 
Yemen 0.38 -0.02 -0.10 0.86 -0.04 -0.14 -0.17 -0.08       0.70** 
Zambia* 0.41 -0.03 -0.03 0.81 -0.08 -0.24 -0.04 -0.29      0.51** 
Zimbabwe 0.04 -0.14 -0.46 0.57 -0.06 -0.90 -0.05 -0.13 -1.13 
          * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
          ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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Table 4.13 
Mean Standardized Scores from Model III for the Encouraging Economic Freedom Index for Low Middle-income  
Countries in 2009 
            Sum Median Score  = 0.75 
Country 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Total 
Score 
Albania* 0.56 -0.01 -0.03 0.86 -0.08 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05    1.00** 
Algeria 0.31 -0.03 -0.01 0.78 -0.10 -0.27 -0.09 -0.12 0.46 
Angola 0.30 -0.10 -0.21 0.81 -0.65 -0.41 -0.08 -0.30 -0.64 
Armenia* 0.57 -0.03 0.00 0.98 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.08     1.29** 
Azerbaijan 0.44 -0.01 0.00 0.89 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03     1.13** 
Belarus 0.25 -0.04 -0.01 0.76 -0.04 -0.19 -0.01 -0.28 0.45 
Bhutan 0.29 -0.07 -0.01 0.48 -0.12 -0.26 -0.04 -0.19 0.07 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.49 -0.09 -0.03 0.87 -0.25 -0.26 -0.10 -0.01 0.62 
Cape Verde* 0.51 -0.07 -0.04 0.74 -0.14 -0.28 -0.11 -0.02 0.59 
China 0.46 -0.06 -0.01 0.81 -0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01     0.94** 
Colombia 0.55 -0.05 -0.02 0.82 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09     1.03** 
Dominican Rep 0.47 -0.03 -0.02 0.83 -0.12 -0.14 -0.06 -0.03     0.90** 
Ecuador 0.23 -0.09 -0.04 0.82 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 0.62 
Egypt 0.47 -0.01 -0.02 0.72 -0.14 -0.03 -0.12 -0.35 0.52 
El Salvador* 0.58 -0.02 -0.05 0.93 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.01     1.13** 
Fiji 0.31 -0.07 -0.03 0.79 -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 0.59 
Georgia* 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.91 -0.01 -0.26 -0.11 -0.04      1.10** 
Guatemala 0.49 -0.05 -0.06 0.89 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04     1.08** 
Honduras* 0.44 -0.04 -0.07 0.58 -0.09 -0.27 -0.16 -0.24 0.16 
Indonesia* 0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.65 -0.07 -0.38 -0.02 -0.23 0.06 
Iran 0.29 -0.11 -0.16 0.00 -0.10 -0.23 -0.38 -0.05 -0.74 
Jamaica 0.57 -0.02 -0.06 0.89 -0.04 -0.36 -0.15 -0.01      0.82** 
     * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
     ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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 Table 4.13  
Cont’d 
            Sum Median Score  = 0.75 
Country 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Time of 
Business 
Cost of 
Business 
Trade 
Policy 
Time of 
Registering 
Cost of 
Registering 
Fiscal 
Policy Inflation 
Total 
Score 
Jordan* 0.47 -0.04 -0.04 0.81 -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 -0.23 0.60 
Kiribati 0.43 -0.02 -0.01 0.99 -0.02 -0.14 -0.02 -0.15     1.06** 
Macedonia 0.41 -0.01 -0.01 0.82 -0.14 -0.27 -0.05 -0.19 0.55 
Maldives 0.41 -0.04 -0.11 0.83 -0.06 -0.73 -0.06 -0.05 0.21 
Marshall Islands 0.37 -0.03 -0.04 0.86 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 -0.05 0.74 
Micronesia 0.47 -0.02 -0.01 0.92 -0.09 -0.03 -0.11 0.00     1.13** 
Morocco* 0.44 -0.04 -0.02 0.83 -0.08 -0.46 -0.09 -0.07 0.50 
Namibia* 0.34 -0.04 -0.06 0.71 -0.01 -0.23 -0.05 -0.27 0.39 
Paraguay* 0.58 -0.09 -0.03 0.90 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.06     1.08** 
Peru* 0.50 -0.08 -0.03 0.89 -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 -0.07     0.93** 
Philippines* 0.43 -0.02 -0.12 0.69 -0.61 -0.02 0.00 -0.22 0.12 
Sri Lanka 0.44 -0.05 -0.01 0.80 -0.16 -0.18 -0.17 -0.07 0.60 
Suriname 0.37 -1.00 -0.13 0.73 -0.38 -0.50 -0.05 0.00 -0.96 
Swaziland 0.40 -0.09 -0.04 0.81 -0.09 -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 0.47 
Syria 0.29 -0.02 -0.02 0.61 -0.04 -1.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.29 
Thailand 0.57 -0.05 -0.01 0.86 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02     1.26** 
Timor-Leste* 0.27 -0.12 -0.01 0.83 -0.15 -0.26 -0.16 0.00 0.39 
Tonga 0.38 -0.04 -0.01 0.63 -0.21 -0.36 -0.05 -0.07 0.27 
Tunisia 0.52 -0.02 -0.01 0.60 -0.08 -0.22 -0.03 -0.08 0.70 
Turkmenistan 0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.90 -0.15 -0.26 -0.13 -0.06 0.29 
Ukraine* 0.39 -0.04 -0.01 0.95 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.34 0.51 
Vanuatu* 0.36 -0.06 -0.06 0.71 -0.37 -0.25 -0.01 -0.09 0.23 
           * Denotes MCC funding in 2009 
           ** Denotes pass (total score greater than sum median score) 
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4.      Summary 
While Model I attempted to replicate how the MCC makes funding decisions Model II 
used the same scoring mechanism and passing requirements (at least half of the indicators in 
the Ruling Justly (3/6) and Encouraging Economic Freedom (3/6), and passed least three of 
the five indicators in the Investing in People category (3/5)) and simply simulated all of the 
data which made up the mean scores used in Model I. Thus Model II could be seen as a 
"check for robustness" in the scores for model I. That is, if a country passed an indicator in 
Model II 97% of the time or only 3% of the time the indicator would seem to be robust. 
However; if a country passed an indicator 43% of the time (Egypt Table 4.7) then more on the 
ground information could be sequestered by the MCC. That is, through the simulation process 
in Model II it would appear that the on the ground reports about a country like Egypt seem to 
be even spilt and that before a funding decision can me made judiciously more information is 
likely needed.    
Model III uses the same indicators as Model's I and II but provides equal weighting to 
each indicator. Model's I and II were simply a counting exercise to see how many indicators a 
country passed with no regard to the degree on which the passed or failed. Model III 
standardized all the indicators (so they could be compared) and then summed up the 
standardized score for ALL indicators. The difference between Model III and Models I and II 
is that Model III takes into account each indicator (even those a country failed). The rationale 
being that a difference between a marginal pass and a marginal fail is just that, marginal. 
However, Model I and II treat that marginal difference as an absolute difference where Model 
III compares it as a marginal difference. That is, a country who passes an indicator 100% of 
the time is rewarded more than a country who passes the same indicator 51% of the time, 
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whereas Model's I and II would treat them the same, simply as a pass. Model III appears to be 
an improvement over what the MCC is currently using in the sense it is more holistic. That is, 
it rewards a country who is improving in all facets of development (even marginally) more so 
than a country who is very good at half of the development indicators and who is poor at the 
other half.  
  
 
115 
 
V.    CONCLUSION 
A.    Summary 
This study set out to replicate, simulate, and suggest improvements to the current 
funding criteria used by the MCC. Building any indicator is a challenge and one which so 
many lives depend upon is an even more daunting task. This study attempted had three 
distinct objectives. First, to use   empirical data from the ten different sources used by the 
MCC to make their funding decisions and replicate that decision making process as defined 
by the MCC. Second, given that the MCC uses a mean score for each indicator which is a 
function of many on the ground scores the thesis used those score distributions to simulate 
passage rates from the defined MCC funding criteria. Third, the study presents an alternative 
holistic scoring criterion which encompasses all the indicators not simply counting the 
numbers of “pass” or “fails” like the MCC currently does.  
The study presents three separate but related models. Model I is set up so that it 
mimics the scoring criterion of the current MCC funding paradigm. That is, it uses all of the 
indicators the MCC and segregates countries into low and low-middle income countries as 
defined by the World Bank. From this, Model I then calculates the median score for each 
indicator for each income group and compares each country to see if it is above or below the 
median, again like the current MCC funding criterion. Model I then follows the MCC scoring 
system of  passing a country where they were above the income class median for at least half 
of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and Encouraging Economic Freedom (3/6), and 
passed least three of the five indicators in the Investing in People category (3/5). 
Model II uses the same methodology and scoring criteria as Model I with the 
exception that it simulates a range of scores instead of using countries mean score. That is, 
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since the MCC solicits many scores for the same indicators and simply takes the mean there is 
an associated distribution of scores for each indicator and each country. If there is one really 
low or really high score the mean value (which the MCC uses) may be misleading and could 
artificially punish or benefit a country. Since the mean score is a function of all the on the 
ground reports if those report scores are skewed then the mean score may actually be 
misleading. By simulating and then pulling random pulls from the actual distribution for each 
indicator Model II can assess how stable an indicator is. It also indicates the robustness of the 
indicator, that is the closer to 0 and 100% (either always failing or always passing) the more 
robust an indicator is, the closer to 50% the less robust an indicator becomes. Methodologies 
such as Model II could serve as a great tool for the MCC or other funding agencies to see 
where more on the ground reports are needed. That is, if a country passes an indicator 47% of 
the time (which according to Model I and the MCC is a “fail”) this could be a signal that more 
on the ground estimates are needed for said country. Idealistically you would like an indicator 
to be robust, close to passing 0 or 100% in terms of model II. What Model I and Model II fail 
to take into account is the holistic nature of an index. That is, is a passage rate of 51% the 
same as passing 100% of the time? Conversely and perhaps more importantly, is passing 0% 
of the time equivalent to passing 48% of the time. In the eyes of the MCC and Model’s I and 
II these passage rates are equivalent. From these concerns Model III was developed. 
Model III was created as an alternative to Model’s I and II and aggregated all scores 
into one; therefore countries that marginally fail some indicators but are well above the 
median for others are rewarded for the later and not punished as much for the former. The 
rationale being that a difference between a marginal pass and a marginal fail is just that, 
marginal. However, Model I and II treat that marginal difference as an absolute difference 
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where Model III compares it as a marginal difference. Model III uses the same indicators as 
the MCC, and in Model's I and II, but instead of having to pass X out of Y indicators a 
country must score above a single value for each index. That is, Model III jettisons the three 
of six rule for Ruling Justly and sums all the standardized scores for each indicator for Ruling 
Justly into one score and compares that score to the median of either LIC or LIMCs 
As was expected there are large differences between the results in Model’s I and II and 
those in Model III. Therefore, the hypothesis of this study is rejected. Those countries like 
Ethiopia who marginal failed nearly ever indicator were punished as such in Model I where it 
failed. However; in Model III where all scores are analyzed it passed. Conversely, a country 
like Paraguay that passed the necessary half of the indicators in the Ruling Justly (3/6) and 
Encouraging Economic Freedom (3/6), and passed least three of the five indicators in the 
Investing in People category (3/5) in Model I failed Model III. This was due to the fact that 
model III is holistic and those indicators that Paraguay failed in Model I they failed badly, and 
as such those “bad” fails were punished more than the multiple marginal fails of Ethiopia. 
Model III finds a host of anomalies such as this. As such, it may be a more appropriate 
measure to make funding decisions in that it looks at ALL of the indicators is not simply a 
counting exercise on how many of them you passed. That is, which is better, a country(A) 
which scores 100% on three indictors and 0% on three indicators (which would pass the 
MCC’s current criteria) or a country (B) who passes 48% of the time on all six indicators 
(which would fail the MCC’s current criteria)? Model I would reward country A and Model 
III would reward country B. It would appear from the extensive development literature that 
development is holistic and in some cases you are only as strong as your weakest link. If this 
is true than Model III may be more appropriate for the MCC to use as a funding decision tool.  
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It was also found in Model’s I and II that some countries who failed the Control of 
Corruption indicator actually were funded by the MCC. This is a talking point in that the 
MCC states that Control of Corruption is the only hard hurdle to funding, meaning if you are 
below the median for your income group you automatically are disqualified. The MCC states 
that while they use a quantitative index they do have some “subjective flexibility” which 
seems to express itself in emerging democracies and political allies.  
These results are useful not only for the MCC, but also for all policy makers who rely 
on subjective indicators when making funding decisions. 
B.    Limitations of Study 
Although this study found some useful tools for development agencies, there are three 
main limitations and shortcomings. First of all, this study only focused on countries’ scores in 
2009 because of limitation of time. Some interesting results could be found while applying 
models over time. Second, the study did not estimate how countries’ changes from LIC to 
LMIC or vice versa could affect the median of income grouping, thus help or hurt other 
countries. Third, the study did not estimate which indicator should not be considered and 
which new ones should be included by the MCC. 
C.    Future Research 
 There are several areas on which future studies should focus. First, a study can be 
extended on the income effect on countries’ scores. Second, a research can be extended on the 
effect of external findings on countries’ scores over the time. Third, a further research could 
be addressed to identify what variables need to be captured when considering experts’ 
perceptions on governance indicators. Fourth, a future research is needed to take into 
considerations domestic experts and firms’ perceptions on governance indicators. Fifth, due to 
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the fact that there are many critics about governance’s indicators, a further study is needed to 
find relevant and credible datasets which determine quality indicators widely-accepted. 
Finally, a future research could address a new methodology that can balance both facts and 
perceptions-based indicators into the scoring system. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
Table 7.1 
Countries That Legal Prohibitions Prohibit Assistance from the United States Government  
Countries  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Low 
Income Burma Burma Burma Burma Burma Burma Burma Burma 
 Burundi Burundi Burundi Cambodia Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
 
Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Côte d’Ivoire Cuba Iraq Madagascar Madagascar 
 Central 
African Rep. 
Central 
African Rep. 
Central 
African Rep. Cuba Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan 
 Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Somalia North Korea Mauritania North Korea 
North 
Korea 
 Liberia Liberia Liberia Sudan Uzbekistan North Korea Uzbekistan Uzbekistan 
 Guinea-
Bissau Guinea-Bissau 
Guinea-
Bissau North Korea Zimbabwe Uzbekistan Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
 Somalia Somalia Somalia Uzbekistan Syria Zimbabwe   
 Sudan Sudan Sudan Zimbabwe  Syria   
 Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Syria     
 Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe      
  Cuba Cuba      
   Iran      
   Korea      
      Serbia           
Low 
Middle-
Income   
Syria Syria Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina China China China 
Iran China China Iran Iran Iraq 
Syria Iran Iran Iraq Syria 
Serbia Fiji Syria 
          Thailand       
Source: MCC (2004-2011). 
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Table 7.2 
 
2009 WGI Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, and Regulatory 
 Quality Scores 
 
  Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice 
Accountability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Country Est.* S.E** N.*** Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. 
Afghanistan -1.57 0.2 9 -2.04 0.18 11 -1.56 0.22 8 -1.39 0.13 10 -1.78 0.19 7 
Albania -0.4 0.14 12 -0.52 0.14 14 -0.2 0.19 10 0.16 0.14 12 0.28 0.17 11 
Algeria -0.49 0.17 12 -0.73 0.14 15 -0.59 0.17 10 -1.04 0.11 15 -0.94 0.17 10 
Angola -1.34 0.18 12 -1.19 0.14 15 -0.92 0.18 10 -1.14 0.12 14 -1 0.16 10 
Armenia -0.59 0.14 15 -0.4 0.14 17 0.07 0.19 11 -0.82 0.12 13 0.34 0.16 12 
Azerbaijan -1.1 0.14 15 -0.81 0.13 17 -0.63 0.18 11 -1.2 0.12 15 -0.28 0.16 12 
Bangladesh -0.96 0.17 13 -0.72 0.14 16 -0.99 0.18 11 -0.37 0.12 14 -0.79 0.16 11 
Belarus -0.78 0.15 11 -0.94 0.15 13 -1.1 0.21 8 -1.54 0.14 10 -1.23 0.18 9 
Benin -0.65 0.16 10 -0.69 0.14 13 -0.48 0.18 10 0.31 0.13 13 -0.36 0.17 9 
Bhutan 0.84 0.21 8 0.16 0.17 10 0.4 0.22 7 -0.63 0.13 8 -1.06 0.18 8 
Bolivia -0.71 0.17 14 -1.22 0.14 16 -0.72 0.18 11 -0.08 0.12 15 -0.98 0.17 10 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.31 0.14 12 -0.39 0.14 14 -0.65 0.2 9 -0.05 0.14 12 -0.06 0.18 10 
Burkina Faso -0.44 0.15 13 -0.28 0.14 16 -0.65 0.17 12 -0.25 0.11 16 -0.13 0.16 11 
Burundi -1.12 0.18 10 -1.2 0.15 13 -1.11 0.18 9 -0.73 0.14 12 -1.15 0.17 9 
Cambodia -1.18 0.15 14 -1.05 0.14 15 -0.74 0.19 10 -0.88 0.12 13 -0.37 0.17 10 
Cameroon -0.92 0.16 13 -1.07 0.14 15 -0.81 0.17 11 -1.03 0.12 15 -0.69 0.16 11 
Cape Verde 0.7 0.2 6 0.47 0.16 8 0 0.21 6 0.85 0.16 8 0.04 0.2 6 
Central African Rep -0.82 0.2 7 -1.32 0.15 10 -1.41 0.2 7 -0.98 0.13 10 -1.12 0.18 7 
Chad -1.39 0.18 9 -1.53 0.15 12 -1.48 0.18 9 -1.4 0.13 13 -1.08 0.17 9 
China -0.53 0.14 13 -0.35 0.14 16 0.12 0.17 11 -1.65 0.12 14 -0.2 0.17 11 
Colombia -0.29 0.15 16 -0.44 0.13 18 0.04 0.17 12 -0.21 0.12 17 0.24 0.17 11 
 Source: WGI (2011).*Denotes mean value **Denotes Standard Error  ***Denotes Number of observations 
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Table 7.2 
Cont’d 
 
  Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice 
Accountability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Country Est.* S.E** N.*** Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. 
Congo, Dem Rep -1.42 0.18 11 -1.7 0.14 14 -1.72 0.18 10 -1.45 0.12 14 -1.62 0.16 10 
Côte d'Ivoire -1.16 0.17 12 -1.33 0.14 15 -1.21 0.17 11 -1.16 0.12 14 -0.97 0.16 11 
Cuba 0.29 0.2 6 -0.65 0.17 10 -0.48 0.22 7 -1.71 0.14 9 -1.6 0.2 7 
Djibouti -0.26 0.23 6 -0.65 0.17 9 -0.91 0.22 6 -1.11 0.16 9 -0.6 0.2 6 
Dominican Rep -0.68 0.17 13 -0.72 0.14 15 -0.44 0.18 11 0.12 0.13 14 -0.15 0.17 10 
Ecuador -0.92 0.17 14 -1.28 0.14 17 -0.84 0.18 11 -0.26 0.12 16 -1.36 0.17 10 
Egypt -0.41 0.17 13 -0.03 0.14 16 -0.3 0.17 11 -1.12 0.11 16 -0.14 0.16 11 
El Salvador -0.17 0.18 13 -0.78 0.15 15 -0.04 0.19 10 0.08 0.12 14 0.38 0.18 9 
Eritrea -0.33 0.21 7 -1.24 0.16 10 -1.41 0.21 6 -2.16 0.13 10 -2.27 0.18 7 
Ethiopia -0.71 0.17 12 -0.77 0.14 15 -0.41 0.17 10 -1.26 0.12 15 -0.98 0.16 10 
Fiji -0.74 0.3 3 -0.76 0.22 6 -0.96 0.28 3 -0.72 0.17 7 -0.95 0.26 4 
Gambia -0.56 0.2 7 -0.43 0.16 10 -0.66 0.19 7 -1.05 0.15 10 -0.3 0.19 8 
Georgia -0.23 0.14 14 -0.17 0.14 16 0.22 0.2 10 -0.18 0.12 13 0.6 0.17 11 
Ghana 0.06 0.15 15 -0.11 0.13 17 0.06 0.17 12 0.5 0.11 17 0.12 0.16 11 
Guatemala -0.6 0.17 14 -1.12 0.14 16 -0.69 0.18 11 -0.33 0.12 15 -0.07 0.17 10 
Guinea -1.23 0.19 9 -1.61 0.16 12 -1.29 0.19 9 -1.43 0.14 11 -1.18 0.17 9 
Guinea-Bissau -1.12 0.26 5 -1.38 0.19 8 -1.07 0.22 5 -0.76 0.16 8 -1.19 0.21 6 
Guyana -0.54 0.2 8 -0.59 0.16 11 -0.21 0.21 7 0.11 0.14 10 -0.61 0.21 7 
Haiti -1.12 0.19 10 -1.34 0.15 12 -1.43 0.2 8 -0.6 0.12 12 -0.83 0.18 8 
Honduras -0.89 0.17 13 -0.87 0.14 16 -0.71 0.18 11 -0.46 0.12 15 -0.24 0.17 10 
India -0.33 0.14 14 0.05 0.14 15 -0.01 0.17 11 0.47 0.13 14 -0.28 0.17 11 
Source: WGI (2011).*Denotes mean value **Denotes Standard Error  ***Denotes Number of observations 
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Cont’d 
 
  Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice 
Accountability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Country Est.* S.E** N.*** Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. 
Iran -0.83 0.19 9 -0.9 0.15 12 -0.74 0.2 8 -1.49 0.12 11 -1.74 0.18 8 
Iraq -1.38 0.21 9 -1.83 0.19 10 -1.26 0.22 7 -1.17 0.14 11 -1.04 0.22 6 
Jamaica -0.44 0.19 9 -0.49 0.16 12 0.13 0.2 8 0.53 0.14 11 0.31 0.19 8 
Jordan 0.27 0.16 12 0.38 0.14 15 0.28 0.18 10 -0.85 0.12 15 0.36 0.17 10 
Kenya -1.11 0.15 15 -1.07 0.13 17 -0.66 0.17 12 -0.32 0.11 17 -0.17 0.16 11 
Kiribati -0.11 0.29 4 0.18 0.22 7 -0.72 0.27 4 0.73 0.22 4 -1.26 0.23 5 
Kyrgyzstan -1.22 0.14 13 -1.29 0.14 16 -0.98 0.2 10 -0.96 0.12 13 -0.36 0.17 11 
Laos -1.14 0.19 10 -0.94 0.15 13 -1.03 0.2 9 -1.71 0.13 10 -1.05 0.18 9 
Lesotho 0.14 0.17 9 -0.26 0.15 12 -0.26 0.18 9 -0.14 0.14 10 -0.58 0.17 9 
Liberia -0.56 0.18 12 -1.09 0.15 14 -1.17 0.19 9 -0.32 0.12 15 -1.21 0.17 8 
Macedonia -0.03 0.15 11 -0.22 0.14 13 -0.14 0.21 8 0.13 0.14 11 0.32 0.18 9 
Madagascar -0.25 0.16 12 -0.74 0.14 15 -0.64 0.17 12 -0.62 0.13 14 -0.47 0.16 11 
Malawi -0.47 0.16 13 -0.19 0.14 16 -0.52 0.17 11 -0.22 0.12 16 -0.53 0.17 10 
Maldives -0.69 0.29 4 -0.09 0.22 7 -0.37 0.27 4 -0.14 0.21 5 -0.41 0.23 5 
Mali -0.69 0.16 12 -0.41 0.14 15 -0.77 0.17 12 0.15 0.13 14 -0.43 0.16 11 
Marshall Islands -0.37 0.39 3 -0.32 0.31 4 -1.44 0.39 3 1.11 0.24 3 -1.01 0.29 3 
Mauritania -0.66 0.17 11 -0.84 0.14 14 -0.9 0.18 10 -1.01 0.12 13 -0.66 0.17 10 
Micronesia -0.11 0.48 2 0.09 0.22 6 -0.59 0.29 3 1.05 0.22 3 -0.88 0.25 4 
             Source: WGI (2011).*Denotes mean value     **Denotes Standard Error  ***Denotes Number of observations 
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                                                                  Cont’d 
 
  Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice 
Accountability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Country Est.* S.E** N.*** Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. 
Mongolia -0.77 0.17 14 -0.39 0.14 16 -0.81 0.18 12 -0.05 0.13 13 -0.35 0.15 13 
Morocco -0.23 0.16 14 -0.16 0.14 16 -0.11 0.17 11 -0.79 0.11 16 -0.01 0.16 11 
Mozambique -0.41 0.15 14 -0.58 0.13 17 -0.34 0.17 12 -0.07 0.11 16 -0.32 0.16 11 
Namibia 0.23 0.16 12 0.26 0.14 15 0.19 0.17 12 0.3 0.12 15 0.08 0.16 11 
Nepal -0.75 0.17 12 -0.96 0.14 15 -0.95 0.19 10 -0.58 0.12 13 -0.78 0.17 10 
Nicaragua -0.76 0.17 14 -0.83 0.14 17 -1.04 0.18 11 -0.49 0.12 16 -0.39 0.17 10 
Niger -0.66 0.18 10 -0.64 0.15 13 -0.75 0.18 10 -0.7 0.13 13 -0.47 0.16 10 
Nigeria -1.07 0.15 15 -1.22 0.13 17 -1.24 0.17 12 -0.85 0.11 17 -0.7 0.16 11 
Pakistan -1.1 0.17 14 -0.93 0.14 16 -0.93 0.18 11 -1 0.12 14 -0.5 0.16 11 
Papua New Guinea -1.39 0.2 8 -0.97 0.16 11 -0.84 0.21 8 0.11 0.14 9 -0.53 0.17 9 
Paraguay -0.88 0.17 12 -0.98 0.14 15 -0.93 0.18 10 -0.24 0.12 14 -0.41 0.18 9 
Peru -0.36 0.15 16 -0.66 0.13 18 -0.36 0.17 12 0.04 0.12 17 0.41 0.17 11 
Philippines -0.71 0.14 15 -0.53 0.14 16 -0.14 0.17 11 -0.12 0.12 15 0.02 0.17 11 
Rwanda 0.13 0.21 9 -0.51 0.16 12 -0.18 0.21 7 -1.29 0.12 13 -0.34 0.18 7 
Sao Tome & Principe -0.4 0.24 4 -0.73 0.17 6 -0.68 0.23 4 0.17 0.17 6 -0.76 0.22 5 
Senegal -0.53 0.15 13 -0.31 0.14 15 -0.4 0.17 12 -0.31 0.12 14 -0.26 0.16 11 
Sierra Leone -0.98 0.19 12 -0.97 0.15 14 -1.18 0.19 9 -0.26 0.12 13 -0.76 0.17 9 
Solomon Islands -0.37 0.29 4 -0.67 0.22 6 -1 0.27 4 0.19 0.22 4 -1.25 0.23 5 
Sri Lanka -0.36 0.17 13 -0.07 0.14 16 -0.17 0.18 11 -0.5 0.12 14 -0.28 0.16 11 
Sudan -1.24 0.18 10 -1.34 0.15 12 -1.32 0.18 10 -1.59 0.13 13 -1.25 0.17 9 
             Source: WGI (2011).*Denotes mean value     **Denotes Standard Error  ***Denotes Number of observations 
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Table 7.2 
 
Cont’d 
 
  Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice 
Accountability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Country Est.* S.E** N.*** Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. Est. S.E N. 
Suriname -0.33 0.22 5 -0.13 0.18 8 -0.01 0.22 5 0.41 0.17 8 -0.65 0.23 6 
Swaziland -0.27 0.22 7 -0.63 0.16 10 -0.7 0.21 6 -1.21 0.15 8 -0.52 0.2 7 
Syria -0.96 0.17 11 -0.47 0.14 14 -0.61 0.18 10 -1.63 0.12 13 -1.07 0.17 10 
Tajikistan -1.11 0.14 13 -1.22 0.14 16 -1.11 0.2 10 -1.33 0.13 12 -1.08 0.17 11 
Tanzania -0.42 0.15 14 -0.44 0.13 17 -0.42 0.17 12 -0.14 0.11 17 -0.38 0.16 11 
Thailand -0.23 0.14 15 -0.13 0.14 16 0.15 0.17 11 -0.4 0.12 15 0.37 0.17 11 
Timor-Leste -0.99 0.21 8 -1.25 0.16 11 -1.13 0.22 6 0.09 0.14 9 -1.16 0.2 7 
Togo -1.08 0.19 9 -0.9 0.15 12 -1.36 0.19 9 -1.04 0.13 11 -0.83 0.17 9 
Tonga -0.7 0.29 4 -0.03 0.22 6 -0.36 0.27 4 -0.05 0.22 4 -0.6 0.23 5 
Tunisia 0.02 0.17 12 0.22 0.14 15 0.41 0.17 11 -1.27 0.12 14 0.1 0.16 11 
Turkmenistan -1.43 0.16 6 -1.37 0.15 9 -1.34 0.23 5 -2.06 0.15 7 -2.07 0.19 7 
Uganda -0.87 0.15 15 -0.43 0.13 17 -0.63 0.17 12 -0.49 0.11 17 -0.17 0.16 11 
Ukraine -0.9 0.13 15 -0.73 0.13 17 -0.77 0.18 11 -0.06 0.12 15 -0.54 0.16 12 
Uzbekistan -1.26 0.15 11 -1.22 0.14 14 -0.72 0.21 9 -1.93 0.12 10 -1.55 0.17 10 
Vanuatu 0.4 0.31 4 0.4 0.21 6 -0.27 0.29 3 0.58 0.21 4 -0.71 0.25 4 
Viet Nam -0.52 0.15 15 -0.43 0.14 16 -0.26 0.18 11 -1.52 0.12 14 -0.56 0.16 11 
Yemen -1.03 0.18 11 -1.15 0.15 14 -1.12 0.2 9 -1.27 0.12 14 -0.6 0.18 9 
Zambia -0.51 0.15 14 -0.48 0.14 16 -0.67 0.17 12 -0.27 0.11 16 -0.45 0.16 11 
Zimbabwe -1.49 0.17 13 -1.91 0.14 16 -1.67 0.17 11 -1.55 0.12 15 -2.29 0.16 11 
Source: WGI (2011).*Denotes mean value     **Denotes Standard Error  ***Denotes Number of observations
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Table 7.3 
 
2009 World Bank Per Capita GNI, Freedom House Civil Liberties and Political Rights, UNESCO Primary Education and 
Girls’ Education Scores. 
 
 Country 
per capita GNI 
(2009 USD) 
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
Primary 
Education (%) 
Girls' 
Education (%) 
Afghanistan $370 6 5 ...* …* 
Albania $3,840 3 3 ...* 88.81 
Algeria $3,620 5 6 ...* 91.45 
Angola $3,450 5 6 ...* ...* 
Armenia $3,350 4 6 3.53 ...* 
Azerbaijan $3,830 5 6 2.94 91.43 
Bangladesh $520 4 4 ...* 63.2 
Belarus $3,380 6 7 4.42 ...* 
Benin $690 2 2 4.24 53.16 
Bhutan $1,900 5 4 ...* 92.44 
Bolivia $1,460 3 3 ...* ...* 
Bosnia & Herzegovina $3,580 3 4 ...* ...* 
Burkina Faso $480 3 5 ...* 39.6 
Burundi $140 5 4 7.07 50.67 
Cambodia $600 5 6 ...* ...* 
Cameroon $1,150 6 6 2.99 67.23 
Cape Verde $3,130 1 1 5.25 86.55 
Central African Rep $410 5 5 1.22 28.84 
Chad $530 6 7 2.29 24.39 
China $2,770 6 7 ...* ...* 
Colombia $3,250 4 3 3.94 116.76 
Sources: World Bank, Freedom House and UNESCO (2011).                                   
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.3 
 
       Cont’d 
 
 Country 
per capita GNI 
(2009 USD) 
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
Primary 
Education (%) 
Girls' Education 
(%) 
Comoros $750 4 3 ...* ...* 
Congo, Dem Rep $150 6 6 ...* 45.65 
Côte d'Ivoire $980 5 6 ...* 38.67 
Cuba ...* 6 7 ...* 98.23 
Djibouti $1,130 5 5 ...* 33.82 
Dominican Rep $3,550 2 2 ...* 89.44 
Ecuador $3,640 3 3 ...* ...* 
Egypt $1,800 5 6 ...* 94.5 
El Salvador $3,480 3 2 ...* ...* 
Eritrea $300 6 7 ...* 43.18 
Ethiopia $280 5 5 ...* 53.24 
Fiji $3,300 4 6 ...* ...* 
Gambia $390 4 5 2.51 79.34 
Georgia $2,470 4 4 ...* 104.44 
Ghana $670 2 1 ...* 80.78 
Guatemala $2,680 4 3 ...* ...* 
Guinea $390 5 7 ...* 52.56 
Guinea-Bissau $250 4 4 ...* ...* 
Guyana $1,420 3 2 3.09 108.78 
Haiti $660 5 4 ...* ...* 
Honduras $1,800 3 3 ...* ...* 
India $1,070 3 2 ...* ...* 
Sources: World Bank, Freedom House and UNESCO (2011).                                   
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.3 
 
      Cont’d 
 
 Country 
per capita GNI  
(2009 USD) 
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
Primary 
Education (%) 
Girls' 
Education (%) 
Indonesia $2,010 3 2 ...* 109.66 
Iran $3,540 6 6 4.04 100.86 
Iraq ...* 6 6 ...* ...* 
Jamaica $3,480 3 2 ...* ...* 
Jordan $3,310 5 5 ...* ...* 
Kenya $770 3 4 ...* ...* 
Kiribati $2,000 1 1 ...* ...* 
Kyrgyzstan $740 4 5 ...* 94.59 
Laos $750 6 7 ...* ...* 
Lesotho $1,080 3 2 ...* 79.37 
Liberia $170 4 3 ...* ...* 
Macedonia $3,460 3 3 ...* ...* 
Madagascar $410 3 4 2.63 79.05 
Malawi $290 4 4 ...* 60.47 
Maldives $3,630 4 4 ...* 111.86 
Mali $580 3 2 3.31 51.54 
Marshall Islands $3,270 1 1 ...* 94.07 
Mauritania $840 5 6 ...* ...* 
Micronesia $2,340 1 1 ...* ...* 
Sources: World Bank, Freedom House and UNESCO (2011).                                   
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.3 
 
       Cont’d 
 
 Country 
per capita GNI 
(2009 USD) 
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
Primary 
Education (%) 
Girls' Education 
(%) 
Moldova $1,470 4 4 8.48 91.47 
Mongolia $1,680 2 2 ...* ...* 
Morocco $2,580 4 5 ...* 77.02 
Mozambique $370 3 3 ...* 50.56 
Namibia $3,360 2 2 ...* 91.2 
Nepal $400 4 4 4.19 ...* 
Nicaragua $1,080 3 4 ...* ...* 
Niger $330 4 3 3.62 33.58 
Nigeria $1,160 4 5 ...* ...* 
Pakistan $980 5 4 1.92 53.9 
Papua New Guinea $1,010 3 4 ...* ...* 
Paraguay $2,180 3 3 ...* 94.67 
Peru $3,450 3 2 2.09 ...* 
Philippines $1,890 3 4 ...* ...* 
Rwanda $410 5 6 ...* ...* 
Sao Tome & Principe $1,020 2 2 ...* ...* 
Senegal $970 3 3 5.47 57.32 
Sierra Leone $320 3 3 3.42 ...* 
Solomon Islands $1,180 3 4 ...* ...* 
Sri Lanka $1,790 4 4 ...* 97.91 
Sudan $1,130 7 7 ...* ...* 
    Sources: World Bank, Freedom House and UNESCO (2011).                                   
   *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.3 
 
      Cont’d 
 
 Country 
per capita GNI 
(2009 USD) 
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
Primary 
Education (%) 
Girls' Education 
(%) 
Suriname $3,200 2 2 ...* ...* 
Swaziland $2,520 5 7 ...* ...* 
Syria $2,090 6 7 ...* 111.48 
Tajikistan $600 5 6 ...* ...* 
Tanzania $430 3 4 ...* 102.44 
Thailand $2,840 4 5 4.08 ...* 
Timor-Leste $2,460 4 3 ...* ...* 
Togo $400 5 5 4.46 51.95 
Tonga $2,560 3 5 ...* ...* 
Tunisia $3,290 5 7 ...* 92.05 
Turkmenistan $2,840 7 7 ...* ...* 
Uganda $420 4 5 2.96 72.76 
Ukraine $3,210 2 3 ...* 95.78 
Uzbekistan $910 7 7 ...* 90.61 
Vanuatu $2,330 2 2 4.8 82.76 
Viet Nam $890 5 7 ...* ...* 
Yemen $950 5 5 ...* ...* 
Zambia $950 3 3 ...* 82.3 
Zimbabwe $340 6 7 ...* ...* 
Sources: World Bank, Freedom House and UNESCO (2011).                                   
   *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.4 
 
2009 CIESIN and YCLEP Child Mortality, Improved Sanitation, Improved Water, and Ecoregion 
Protection Scores. 
 
Country 
Child 
Mortality 
Improved Sanitation 
(%) 
Improved Water 
(%) 
Ecoregion Protection 
(%) 
Afghanistan 34.1 30 22 4.1 
Albania 98.9 97 97 96.3 
Algeria 98.4 94 85 63.1 
Angola 29.6 50 51 98.4 
Armenia 1 91 98 73.8 
Azerbaijan 93 80 78 67.6 
Bangladesh 90.8 36 80 18 
Belarus 98.1 93 100 70.1 
Benin 72.4 30 65 98.9 
Bhutan 85.6 52 81 100 
Bolivia 88.9 43 86 100 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 98.7 95 99 3.8 
Burkina Faso 40.7 13 72 100 
Burundi 46.8 41 71 51.5 
Cambodia 80.1 28 65 100 
Cameroon 55.9 51 70 81.7 
Cape Verde 96.4 --* --* 24.9 
Central African Rep 41.1 31 66 100 
Chad 34.3 9 48 73.5 
China 95.4 65 88 85.7 
Colombia 95 78 93 95.1 
Sources: CIESIN and YCLEP (2011). 
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.4 
 
      Cont’d 
 
Country 
Child 
Mortality 
Improved Sanitation 
(%) 
Improved Water 
(%) 
Ecoregion Protection 
(%) 
Comoros 89.3 35 85 0 
Congo, Dem Rep 35 31 46 99.9 
Côte d'Ivoire 71.8 24 81 100 
Cuba 98.2 98 91 65.9 
Djibouti 68.9 67 92 0 
Dominican Rep 97.4 79 95 80.5 
Ecuador 96.7 84 95 93.8 
Egypt 95.7 66 98 59 
El Salvador 96.8 86 84 23.9 
Eritrea 84.6 5 60 48.1 
Ethiopia 60 11 42 99.9 
Fiji 96.6 71 47 18.5 
Gambia 69.5 52 86 14.6 
Georgia 98.7 93 99 35.2 
Ghana 66.7 10 80 99.4 
Guatemala 93.3 84 96 90.9 
Guinea 61.3 19 70 67.6 
Guinea-Bissau 34.2 33 57 100 
Guyana 89.5 81 93 30.9 
Haiti 83 19 58 2.7 
Honduras 91.7 66 84 97.5 
India 79.8 28 89 45.2 
Sources: CIESIN and YCLEP (2011). 
 *Denotes no scores 
  
 
 
138 
Table 7.4 
 
      Cont’d 
 
Country 
Child 
Mortality 
Improved Sanitation 
(%) 
Improved Water 
(%) 
Ecoregion Protection 
(%) 
Indonesia 96.2 52 80 100 
Iran 96.7 --* --* 68.5 
Iraq 94.6 76 77 0 
Jamaica 96.5 83 93 100 
Jordan 98.3 85 98 88.5 
Kenya 69.9 42 57 86.7 
Kiribati --* 33 65 100 
Kyrgyzstan 93.9 93 89 34.4 
Laos 88.7 48 60 100 
Lesotho 73.8 36 78 2.2 
Liberia 64.7 32 64 99.2 
Macedonia --* --* --* --* 
Madagascar 73.5 12 47 30.5 
Malawi 71.2 60 76 97.3 
Maldives 96.8 59 83 0 
Mali 33.2 45 60 24.3 
Marshall Islands --* --* --* 18.1 
Mauritania 63.6 24 60 5.4 
Micronesia --* --* --* --* 
Sources: CIESIN and YCLEP (2011). 
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.4 
 
      Cont’d 
 
Country 
Child 
Mortality 
Improved Sanitation 
(%) 
Improved Water 
(%) 
Ecoregion Protection 
(%) 
Moldova 96.2 79 90 12.8 
Mongolia 98.3 50 72 80.7 
Morocco 95.8 72 83 31.8 
Mozambique 50.8 31 42 97.5 
Namibia 87.8 35 93 98.1 
Nepal 91.6 27 89 79.6 
Nicaragua 96.9 48 79 77.9 
Niger 34.7 7 42 68.9 
Nigeria 38.1 30 47 99.3 
Pakistan 80.8 58 90 92.8 
Papua New Guinea 86.5 45 40 21.3 
Paraguay 95.4 70 77 53 
Peru 91.5 72 84 86.3 
Philippines 97 78 93 100 
Rwanda 56.4 23 65 85 
Sao Tome & Principe 82.9 24 86 0 
Senegal 53.8 28 77 99.6 
Sierra Leone 65.3 11 53 49.4 
Solomon Islands 90.9 32 70 0.9 
Sri Lanka 97.2 86 82 94 
Sudan 68.1 35 70 38.6 
Sources: CIESIN and YCLEP (2011). 
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.4 
 
      Cont’d 
 
 
Country 
Child 
Mortality 
Improved Sanitation 
(%) 
Improved Water 
(%) 
Ecoregion Protection 
(%) 
Suriname 93.7 82 92 95.4 
Swaziland 72.7 50 60 30.1 
Syria 98.3 92 89 6.4 
Tajikistan 86.5 92 67 38.1 
Tanzania 68.9 33 55 100 
Thailand 97.5 96 98 94.4 
Timor-Leste --* --* --* --* 
Togo 79.8 12 59 100 
Tonga 97 96 100 100 
Tunisia 98.2 85 94 12.6 
Turkmenistan 89.7 --* --* 30.4 
Uganda 62.9 33 64 100 
Ukraine 97.8 93 97 34.3 
Uzbekistan 92.7 96 88 21.8 
Vanuatu 95.8 --* --* 41.8 
Viet Nam 97.3 65 92 56 
Yemen 84.8 46 66 0 
Zambia 48.6 52 58 100 
Zimbabwe 72.5 46 81 100 
Sources: CIESIN and YCLEP (2011). 
 *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.5 
 
2009 WHO MCV, DTP3, Health Expenditures and WEO/IMF Fiscal Policy and Inflation Scores 
 
Country MCV (%) DPT3 (%) 
Health 
Expenditures (%) Fiscal Policy (%) Inflation (%) 
Afghanistan 76 83 3.7 -1.57 -12.24 
Albania 97 98 8.4 -7.41 2.22 
Algeria 88 93 9.2 -5.43 5.74 
Angola 77 73 8.4 -4.9 13.72 
Armenia 96 93 6.6 -7.69 3.54 
Azerbaijan 67 73 3.7 6.77 1.5 
Bangladesh 89 94 7.9 -3.68 5.43 
Belarus 99 96 8.8 -0.42 12.95 
Benin 72 83 8.5 -3.3 2.16 
Bhutan 98 96 13.3 2.27 8.59 
Bolivia 86 85 8 0.61 3.35 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 93 90 15.1 -5.64 -0.38 
Burkina Faso 75 82 16.3 -5.34 2.6 
Burundi 91 92 11.8 58.48 10.66 
Cambodia 92 94 7.5 -4.08 -0.66 
Cameroon 74 80 8.2 -0.05 3.04 
Cape Verde 96 99 10.2 -6.26 0.99 
Central African Rep 62 54 11 -0.12 3.52 
Chad 23 23 13.8 -9.92 10.1 
China 94 97 10.3 -3.09 -0.68 
Colombia 95 92 17.9 -2.53 4.2 
Sources: WHO and WEO/IMF (2011). 
  *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.5 
 
Cont’d 
 
Country MCV (%) DPT3 (%) 
Health 
Expenditures (%) Fiscal Policy (%) Inflation (%) 
Comoros 79 83 8 2.7 4.79 
Congo, Dem Rep 76 77 1.7 -5.17 46.22 
Côte d'Ivoire 67 81 5.1 -1.57 1.01 
Cuba 96 96 14.7 --* --* 
Djibouti 73 89 13.9 -4.58 1.67 
Dominican Rep 79 82 12.4 -3.49 1.44 
Ecuador 66 75 8.4 -4.29 5.16 
Egypt 95 97 5.9 -6.9 16.24 
El Salvador 95 91 12.3 -5.55 0.43 
Eritrea 95 99 3.1 -14.73 33 
Ethiopia 75 79 11.4 -0.94 36.4 
Fiji 94 99 9.1 -5.07 5.53 
Gambia 96 98 11.6 -2.43 4.55 
Georgia 83 88 7.5 -6.54 1.73 
Ghana 93 94 12.8 -5.82 19.25 
Guatemala 92 92 15.9 -3.15 1.86 
Guinea 51 57 4.3 -7.25 7.9 
Guinea-Bissau 76 68 4 2.85 -1.64 
Guyana 97 98 14.5 -3.52 2.95 
Haiti 59 59 9.5 -4.41 3.43 
Honduras 99 98 13.2 -4.67 8.67 
India 71 66 4.1 -9.09 10.88 
Sources: WHO and WEO/IMF (2011). 
  *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.5 
 
Cont’d 
 
Country MCV (%) DPT3 (%) 
Health 
Expenditures (%) Fiscal Policy (%) Inflation (%) 
Indonesia 82 82 6.9 -1.76 4.81 
Iran 99 99 8.7 1.04 10.8 
Iraq 69 65 3.1 -22.08 -2.19 
Jamaica 88 90 5.6 -10.93 9.57 
Jordan 95 98 16.1 -8.5 -0.67 
Kenya 74 75 5.4 -5.51 10.55 
Kiribati 82 86 8.7 -12.64 8.76 
Kyrgyzstan 99 95 11.7 -1.27 6.85 
Laos 59 57 3.8 -6.54 0.03 
Lesotho 85 83 8.2 -3.86 5.85 
Liberia 64 64 17.2 -11.97 7.43 
Macedonia --* --* --* -2.65 -1.64 
Madagascar 64 78 15.1 -3.07 8.96 
Malawi 92 93 12.1 -5.4 8.43 
Maldives 98 98 7.5 -20.83 4 
Mali 71 74 9.3 -3.27 2.22 
Marshall Islands 94 93 20 --* --* 
Mauritania 59 64 4.9 -5.13 2.22 
Micronesia 86 91 20.6 --* --* 
     Sources: WHO and WEO/IMF (2011). 
      *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.5 
 
Cont’d 
 
Country MCV (%) DPT3 (%) 
Health 
Expenditures (%) Fiscal Policy (%) Inflation (%) 
Moldova 90 85 14.1 -6.35 0.01 
Mongolia 94 95 10.5 -4.99 6.27 
Morocco 98 99 7 -2.21 0.97 
Mozambique 77 76 14.2 -5.51 3.26 
Namibia 76 83 12.1 -1.67 8.78 
Nepal 79 82 8.6 -2.99 12.63 
Nicaragua 99 98 17.9 -1.89 3.69 
Niger 73 70 14.5 -5.46 1.14 
Nigeria 41 42 6.4 -10.19 12.54 
Pakistan 80 85 3.6 -5.18 20.78 
Papua New Guinea 58 64 8 -9.64 6.92 
Paraguay 91 92 12.3 0.53 2.59 
Peru 91 93 15.3 -1.87 2.94 
Philippines 88 87 7.2 -3.69 3.25 
Rwanda 92 97 16.8 0.28 10.35 
Sao Tome & Principe 90 98 13.2 -16.95 16.96 
Senegal 79 86 11.6 -4.95 -1.71 
Sierra Leone 71 75 6.4 -3.2 9.25 
Solomon Islands 60 81 16.8 1.59 7.06 
Sri Lanka 96 97 7.3 -9.85 3.42 
Sudan 82 84 9.8 -4.84 11.26 
Sources: WHO and WEO/IMF (2011). 
      *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.5 
 
Cont’d 
 
Country MCV (%) DPT3 (%) 
Health 
Expenditures (%) Fiscal Policy (%) Inflation (%) 
Suriname 88 87 12.6 -2.98 -0.14 
Swaziland 95 95 9.3 -6.43 7.45 
Syria 81 80 4.6 -2.9 2.8 
Tajikistan 89 93 6.4 -5.23 6.51 
Tanzania 91 85 18.1 -4.81 11.83 
Thailand 98 99 14 -3.18 -0.85 
Timor-Leste 70 72 9.8 239.27 0.06 
Togo 84 89 6.4 -2.82 1.94 
Tonga 99 99 14.5 -2.66 3.43 
Tunisia 98 99 10.4 -1.48 3.53 
Turkmenistan 99 96 7 7.61 -2.67 
Uganda 68 64 11.6 -2.38 14.2 
Ukraine 94 90 8.6 -6.26 15.9 
Uzbekistan 95 98 9.6 3.14 14.08 
Vanuatu 52 68 12.2 -0.75 4.28 
Viet Nam 97 96 8.9 -8.99 6.72 
Yemen 58 66 4.3 -10.21 3.68 
Zambia 85 81 15.7 -2.59 13.39 
Zimbabwe 76 73 --* -2.9 6.22 
     Sources: WHO and WEO/IMF (2011). 
      *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.6 
 
2009 IFC Days and Cost of Starting Business, IFC/IFAD Days and Cost of Registering Property, and Heritage 
Foundation Trade Policy Scores 
 
Country 
Days to 
Start 
Cost of 
Starting (%) 
Days to 
Register  
Cost of 
Registering (%)  
Trade 
Policy 
Afghanistan 9 59.5 250 7 --* 
Albania 8 25.8 42 3.4 75.8 
Algeria 24 10.8 51 7.5 68.6 
Angola 68 196.8 334 11.6 72 
Armenia 18 3.6 4 0.3 86.4 
Azerbaijan 10 3.2 11 0.3 78.4 
Bangladesh 73 25.7 245 10.4 40.2 
Belarus 31 7.8 21 5.2 67.2 
Benin 31 196 120 11.9 67.4 
Bhutan 46 8.5 64 0 42 
Bolivia 50 112.4 92 4.9 81.8 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 60 30.8 128 0 77.2 
Burkina Faso 16 62.3 136 13.4 70.4 
Burundi 32 215 94 7.7 63 
Cambodia 85 151.7 56 4.4 63.4 
Cameroon 38 138 93 19.2 56 
Cape Verde 52 35.7 73 7.7 65.4 
Central African Rep 22 237.6 75 18.6 50.4 
Chad 75 253.1 44 18.7 58.4 
China 41 8.4 29 3.7 71.4 
Colombia 36 14.9 23 2.4 72.4 
        Sources: IFC, IFAD, and Heritage Foundation (2011). 
       *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.6 
 
       Cont’d 
 
Country 
Days to 
Start 
Cost of 
Starting (%) 
Days to 
Register  
Cost of 
Registering (%)  
Trade 
Policy 
Comoros 24 188.6 24 20.8 27.2 
Congo, Dem Rep 133 935.4 54 9.2 62.2 
Côte d'Ivoire 40 135.1 62 13.9 70.4 
Cuba --* --* --* --* 64.4 
Djibouti 37 200.2 40 13.2 31.8 
Dominican Rep 19 19.4 60 3.8 73 
Ecuador 65 35.3 16 2.2 72.6 
Egypt 7 18.3 72 0.9 63.4 
El Salvador 17 49.6 31 3.7 81.8 
Eritrea 84 102.2 78 9.2 69.2 
Ethiopia 16 29.8 43 3.1 68.6 
Fiji 46 25.2 68 2 69.6 
Gambia 27 254.9 66 7.6 59.6 
Georgia 3 4 3 0 80.6 
Ghana 13 30.7 34 1.2 63 
Guatemala 34 53.4 30 1.1 78.4 
Guinea 41 135.7 104 13.9 59.6 
Guinea-Bissau 259 465.7 211 5.4 66.8 
Guyana 40 68.4 34 4.5 72.6 
Haiti 195 266 405 6.4 79.4 
Honduras 20 52.6 23 5.6 78 
India 30 70.1 44 7.5 51 
Sources: IFC, IFAD, and Heritage Foundation (2011). 
            *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.6 
 
      Cont’d 
 
Country 
Days to 
Start 
Cost of 
Starting (%) 
Days to 
Register  
Cost of 
Registering (%)  
Trade 
Policy 
Indonesia 76 77.9 39 10.7 76.4 
Iran 28 4.6 36 10.6 57.4 
Iraq 77 150.7 51 6.5 --* 
Jamaica 8 7.9 55 11 70.6 
Jordan 14 60.4 21 10 78.8 
Kenya 30 39.7 64 4.1 71.8 
Kiribati 21 64.6 513 0.1 55 
Kyrgyzstan 15 7.4 8 3.9 87.6 
Laos 100 14 135 4.1 66.4 
Lesotho 40 37.9 101 8.2 57 
Liberia 31 61.6 50 13.3 53.8 
Macedonia 9 3.8 66 3.4 81.6 
Madagascar 7 11 74 7.5 72.6 
Malawi 39 125.9 88 3.3 68.8 
Maldives 9 11.5 --* --* 44 
Mali 25 103.2 29 20.3 73 
Marshall Islands 17 17.3 --* --* --* 
Mauritania 19 33.9 49 5.2 75.6 
Micronesia 16 137.5 --* --* 81 
Sources: IFC, IFAD, and Heritage Foundation (2011). 
            *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.6 
 
       Cont’d 
 
Country 
Days to 
Start 
Cost of 
Starting (%) 
Days to 
Register  
Cost of 
Registering (%)  
Trade 
Policy 
Moldova 15 8.9 48 0.8 81.6 
Mongolia 13 4 11 2.1 81.2 
Morocco 12 20 47 4.9 68 
Mozambique 26 22.9 42 12.9 73.4 
Namibia 66 22.1 23 9.9 88.4 
Nepal 31 60.2 5 6.3 63.2 
Nicaragua 39 121 124 3.5 79.2 
Niger 19 170.1 35 11.1 70.4 
Nigeria 31 90.1 82 20.9 61.8 
Pakistan 24 12.6 50 7.3 65.6 
Papua New Guinea 51 21.7 72 5.1 87.2 
Paraguay 35 67.9 46 2 83.6 
Peru 65 25.7 33 3.3 79.4 
Philippines 53 30.4 33 4.3 78.6 
Rwanda 14 108.9 315 0.6 61.2 
Sao Tome & Principe 144 88.9 62 10.9 60 
Senegal 8 72.7 124 20.6 71.2 
Sierra Leone 17 145.8 86 17 66 
Solomon Islands 57 63.6 297 5.1 66.4 
Sri Lanka 38 7.1 83 5.1 71 
Sudan 39 50.8 9 3.1 --* 
Sources: IFC, IFAD, and Heritage Foundation (2011). 
            *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.6 
 
       Cont’d 
 
Country 
Days to 
Start 
Cost of 
Starting (%) 
Days to 
Register  
Cost of 
Registering (%)  
Trade 
Policy 
Suriname 694 125.2 193 13.9 64.2 
Swaziland 60 35.1 44 7.1 71.6 
Syria 16 18.2 19 28 54 
Tajikistan 62 27.6 37 1.8 82.6 
Tanzania 29 41.5 73 4.4 75.6 
Thailand 33 4.9 2 1.1 75.6 
Timor-Leste 83 6.6 --* --* 73 
Togo 53 251.3 295 13.4 70.6 
Tonga 25 9.6 108 10.2 56 
Tunisia 11 7.9 39 6.1 53 
Turkmenistan --* --* --* --* 79.2 
Uganda 25 100.7 77 4.1 75.2 
Ukraine 27 5.5 93 4.3 84 
Uzbekistan 15 10.3 78 1.5 65.4 
Vanuatu 39 54.8 188 7 63 
Viet Nam 50 16.8 57 1.2 63.4 
Yemen 13 93 19 3.8 76.2 
Zambia 18 28.6 39 6.6 71.2 
Zimbabwe 97 432.7 30 25.1 50.4 
Sources: IFC, IFAD, and Heritage Foundation (2011). 
            *Denotes no scores 
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Table 7.7 
MCC’s Compact Programs to Date 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Countries Nicaragua  Armenia Lesotho Tanzania Senegal Philippines Malawi 
Madagascar Benin Mongolia Namibia Moldova 
Honduras  
El 
Salvador Morocco 
Burkina 
Faso Jordan 
Cape Verde Ghana Mozambique 
Georgia Mali 
    Vanuatu           
                                  Source: MCC (2011b).  
Table 7.8 
MCC’s Threshold Programs to Date 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Countries Burkina Faso Tanzania Kenya Niger Liberia 
Malawi Zambia Uganda Rwanda 
Paraguay 
II 
Timor-
Leste 
Albania Sao-Tome and Principle Albania II 
Ukraine Guyana 
Kyrgyz 
Republic  
Moldova Peru 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Paraguay 
    Jordan         
            Source: MCC (2011b).
  
 
 
 
 
 
